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Direct vs. Derivative, or "What's a Lawsuit Between Friends in an
'Incorporated Partnership'?"
Abstract
In any context the distinction between direct and derivative claims carries significant consequences. The
procedural requirements are different, as are the available remedies. In addition, the remedies benefit different
parties. A successful derivative claim typically enriches the corporate treasury, while a successful direct claim
typically puts money directly in the hands of the shareholder claimant. Moreover, derivative defendants can
shelter behind several powerful bulwarks-including special litigation committees and the business judgment
rule-that are unavailable to direct defendants.
Under the 'internal affairs' doctrine, Minnesota law governs the direct/derivative issue for all Minnesota
corporations. Current Minnesota law provides inadequate guidance when the corporation is closely held. The
inadequacy has two main sources. First, the Minnesota rule for distinguishing between direct and derivative
claims in general contains a serious conceptual flaw which confuses analysis regardless of the number of
shareholders. Second, Minnesota close corporation cases rarely address the direct/derivative issue, and those
that do, do so in a cursory fashion. Minnesota law, therefore, lacks a comprehensive, coherent approach for
making the direct/derivative distinction in a Minnesota close corporation.
This article seeks to improve matters by (1) examining and proposing a remedy for the fundamental
conceptual flaw and (2) providing a conceptual framework for making the fine distinctions necessary in the
close corporation context. As background, Part II describes direct and derivative claims in their pure forms.
Part III describes the special problems faced by derivative plaintiffs as contrasted with direct plaintiffs and
thereby shows why the direct/derivative distinction matters. Part IV explains why it is important to draw that
distinction early in any litigation. Part V examines and critiques Minnesota's current approach to the direct/
derivative analysis. Part VI proposes a special rule for making the distinction in the context of closely held
corporations, and Part VII wraps up the analysis with some important details concerning procedure and
remedies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In any context the distinction between direct and derivative
claims carries significant consequences.' The procedural
requirements are different,2 as are the available remedies.' In
addition, the remedies benefit different parties. A successful
derivative claim typically enriches the corporate treasury,4 while
a successful direct claim typically puts money directly in the
hands of the shareholder claimant.' Moreover, derivative
defendants can shelter behind several powerful
bulwarks-including special litigation committees' and the
business judgment rule 7 -that are unavailable to direct defen-
dants.'
1. This article focusses exclusively on the corporate context. For a discussion of
derivative claims in the context of limited liability companies, see GARTER G. BISHOP &
DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LABILTY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW 10.07
(1994). For a discussion of derivative claims in the context of limited partnerships, see
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.03
(1994 & Supp. 1995). The direct versus derivative distinction is largely inapposite to
general partnerships, because "[iun most situations, and in most jurisdictions, [breach
of duty] claims must be brought within an action for an accounting. That proceeding
involves both the partnership itself and all the individual partners, and it sorts out both
claims among the parmers and claims between individual partners and the partnership."
BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra, 10.01 [1] [c]. See also DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY
AND PARTNERSHIP: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS, § 9.10 (1995) (describing an action
for an accounting).
2. See infra part III.A (discussing the contemporaneous ownership requirement,
adequate representation requirement and demand requirement).
3. See infra notes 47-48 (discussing the panoply of remedies for direct claims); see
also infra notes 93-95 (discussing standard remedies in derivative litigation).
4. See infra notes 93-113 (discussing standard recoveries in derivative litigation and
the exceptional circumstances in which courts order payments directly to shareholders).
A successful derivative suit also benefits the attorney for the derivative plaintiff. The
recovery funds the payment of attorney's fees. See infra notes 114-17.
5. See infra note 47 (discussing standard buy-out remedy in direct litigation). In
contrast to the derivative plaintiff's attorney, the attorney for the direct plaintiff will
recover attorney's fees only in exceptional cases. See infra note 48.
6. See infra part III.B.
7. See infra part III.C.
8. Derivative plaintiffs also face the procedural strictures of Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure 23.06, see infra part IIlA; the prospect of the corporation indemnifying
the alleged wrongdoers, see infra part III.D.; and the possibility that the articles of




In the context of close corporations,9 distinguishing
between direct and derivative suits can be especially difficult, and
the stakes can be especially high. The difficulty arises from the
special nature of close corporations. As modem corporate law
has come to recognize, for many purposes a close corporation
amounts to an "incorporated partnership"'L-i.e., an aggregate
of mutual fiduciaries rather than the "tripartite and hierarchical"
structure that comprises an entity separate from all its own-
er/operators.1 The mutual fiduciary relationships support
direct suits in circumstances that might otherwise engender only
derivative claims.
12
The stakes can be high because direct claims in close
corporations are increasingly frequent. Except for securities
fraud claims, 3 direct suits within a public corporation are
unusual. Direct suits are available when significant changes in
9. Minnesota law defines a close corporation as "a corporation which does not
have more than 35 shareholders." MINN. STAT. § 302A.01 1, subd. 6a (1994). Since this
article focusses on Minnesota law, it will use this definition unless the context indicates
otherwise. Many other jurisdictions use a functional approach to defining close or
closely held corporations. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505,
511-12 (Mass. 1975). See generally Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? - The
Foibles of Fairness in Closely Held Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143 (1990).
Generally,
[c] lose corporations have a limited number of shareholders, and most, if not
all, of the shareholders are active in the corporation's day-to-day business. The
corporation typically is an important (and often principal) source of income
for each shareholder. Payout is frequently in the form of salary rather than
dividends. The success of the business usually depends on harmony and
cooperation among the co-owners.
If things go sour, exit is difficult [because there] ... is no ready market
for the shares in a close corporation.
Id. at 1148-49. Otherjurisdictions permit corporations possessing specified characteris-
tics to opt in to statutory close corporation status. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 344
(1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.1801-.1837 (West 1992). As to whether a corporation
that fails to opt in should still be treated as a close corporation when a minority
shareholder claims oppression, compare Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380-81 (Del.
1993) (holding "no") with Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 322-23 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (holding "yes"), cert. denied, 561 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1990)).
10. For the origins of this term, see Kleinberger, supra note 9, at 1150-51 nn.19-21.
11. Kleinberger, supra note 9, at 1144.
12. See infra notes 341-44 and accompanying text (suggesting that direct suits be
allowed when derivative harm has the purpose and effect of targeting the minority
shareholder).
13. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-
RATIONS, 757-70 (6th ed. 1988); 2 JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 15.2, at 15.19
(1995).
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the corporate structure give shareholders appraisal rights. 4
Also, direct suits are available when the corporation itself is up
for sale; in those circumstances the board of directors may owe
a direct duty to shareholders to maximize the selling price. 5
Otherwise, however, shareholder claims in a public corporation
are derivative. In contrast, the direct suit has become the
standard device for resolving disputes among owners of a close
corporation.
16
Under the "internal affairs" doctrine, Minnesota law governs
the direct/derivative issue for all Minnesota corporations. 7
14. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.471 (1994) (establishing circumstances under
which shareholders have appraisal rights), 302A.473 (delineating the procedures for
perfecting and enforcing those rights). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1)
(Supp. 1994) (denying appraisal rights to shareholders in Delaware corporations whose
interests are publicly traded).
15. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (imposing the duty on directors in a Delaware corporation); see also infra
notes 266-68 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon).
16. Discussion of such suits has become a prominent feature of continuing legal
education seminars. SeeJOSEPH W. ANTHONY & RICHARD T. OSTLAND, MINN. INST. OF
LEGAL EDUC. (MILE), CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS: LITIGATION UPDATE 1993, LYING,
CHEATING, AND STEALING (Dec. 16, 1993); TERENCE M. FRUTH & DOUGLAS L. ELSASS,
MILE, CORPORATE PRACTICE INSTITUTE, LITIGATION TO PROTECT MINORITY SHAREHOLD-
ER RIGHTS (June 9-10, 1993); F. HODGE O'NEAL, MINN. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.,
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS IN MINNESOTA, SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES: OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (May, 1993); LAWRENCE J. FIELD & ROBERT STRIKER, MILE,
LITIGATING THE SECURITIES AND THE CORPORATE ARENA, LITIGATION UNDER MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.751: A REVIEW OF CASES (Sept. 10, 1993); RICHARD G. WILSON, MILE, CORPO-
RATE PRACTICE INSTITUTE, DEFENDING SHAREHOLDER AND DERIVATIVE LITIGATION (1989);
ROBERT F. STRAUSS & WILLIAM J. O'BRIEN, MILE, BUYING-SELLING-MERGING CLOSELY
HELD CORPORATIONS: PROTECTING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1989). The importance
of such suits is also established inferentially, by considering the ferocity of plaintiff
lawyers when told that, even within a close corporation, some suits must be brought as
derivative actions. See, e.g., Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn Vegoe Boraas, Minority
Shareholder Rights - Revisited, HENNEPIN LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 20 ("With a stroke of its
pen, a three-judge panel of the Minnesota Court of Appeals may have done more
damage to minority shareholder rights in Minnesota than 15 years of lobbying by
corporate managers."). See also infra note 167 (discussing plaintiff counsel's vitriolic
response to the appointment of a special litigation committee in Skoglund v. Brady, 541
N.W.2d 17 (Minn. CL App. 1995), petition for review denied, (Minn. Feb. 27, 1996)).
17. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 1, 6.08[4] n.298. Bishop and
Kleinberger state that:
Under the internal affairs doctrine, disputes concerning "the
relations inter se of the corporation, its shareholders, directors,
officers or agents" are usually decided according to the law of the
state of incorporation. The doctrine has three rationales: (1) the
need for uniform rules to govern the internal structures and working
of the organization; (2) the notion that participants in the organiza-
tion either have tacitly selected the law of the state of incorporation
1206 [Vol. 22
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Current Minnesota law provides inadequate guidance when the
corporation is closely held. The inadequacy has two main
sources. First, the Minnesota rule for distinguishing between
direct and derivative claims in general contains a serious
conceptual flaw which confuses analysis regardless of the number
of shareholders. Second, Minnesota close corporation cases
rarely address the direct/derivative issue, and those that do, do
so in a cursory fashion. Minnesota law, therefore, lacks a
comprehensive, coherent approach for making the
direct/derivative distinction in a Minnesota close corporation.
This article seeks to improve matters by (1) examining and
proposing a remedy for the fundamental conceptual flaw and (2)
providing a conceptual framework for making the fine distinc-
tions necessary in the close corporation context. As background,
Part II describes direct and derivative claims in their pure forms.
Part III describes the special problems faced by derivative
plaintiffs as contrasted with direct plaintiffs and thereby shows
why the direct/derivative distinction matters. Part IV explains
why it is important to draw that distinction early in any litigation.
Part V examines and critiques Minnesota's current approach to
the direct/derivative analysis. Part VI proposes a special rule for
making the distinction in the context of closely held corpora-
tions, and Part VII wraps up the analysis with some important
details concerning procedure and remedies.
II. THE PURE FoRMs OF DIRECT AND DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
A. Direct Claims
In learning to distinguish between direct and derivative
claims, it is useful to first understand each claim in its pure
form. A shareholder asserts a direct claim to vindicate some
right personal to the shareholder. The shareholder suffers the
harm directly, rather than as a consequence of damage to the
corporation. For example, the right to vote is an incident of
shareholder status."8 A corporation that wrongfully denies or
to govern their internal affairs or would have done so had they
considered the matter; and (3) the advantages of having a clear,
easily applied rule.
Id. (citations omitted).
18. MINN. STAT. § 302A.445, subd. 3 (1994) (establishing one vote per share as the
default rule). "[T]he articles (of incorporation] or... the terms of the shares" may
19961
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abrogates that right injures the shareholder directly and gives
rise to a direct cause of action." Similarly, preemptive rights
belong directly to each shareholder, ° and wrongful interfer-
ence with those rights creates a direct claim. 1 Likewise, a
shareholder has a direct right to inspect certain corporate
records22 and a direct claim to remedy any wrongful denial of
that right.
23
In the close corporation context, the most frequently
asserted direct right is the right to continued employment.
24
Under Minnesota law, this right most often arises from the
"reasonable expectations" of employee-shareholders. 5 Wrong-
create nonvoting shares, but in some circumstances even the holders of nonvoting
shares have the right to vote. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 302A.137 (1994) (requiring
class or series voting on certain amendments to the articles of incorporation).
19. Warthan v. Midwest Consol. Ins. Agencies, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990) (defendant shareholders transferred corporate assets to another
corporation without statutorily-required shareholder vote).
20. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.413 (1994).
21. Henricksen v. Big League Game Co., No. CO-95-388. 1995 WL 550935, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1995). Even without preemptive rights, improper dilution of
a shareholder's voting power can create a direct claim. See, e.g., Whetstone v. Hossfeld
Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. 1990); Wenzel v. Mathies, 542 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996), petition for review denied, (Minn. Mar. 28, 1996).
22. MINN. STAT. § 302A.461, subd. 4 (1994).
23. Warthan, 450 N.W.2d at 149; Chabot v. Industrial Relations Council, Inc., No.
8720942 (St. Louis County Dist. Ct. Nov. 27, 1989), affd, No. C8-90-300, 1990 WL
119371 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1990); Frenzel v. Logistics, Inc., No. 457733 (Ramsey
County Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1985). Shareholders also receive dividends in their capacity
as shareholders, although only in extraordinary circumstances will the failure to pay
dividends constitute a breach of duty. See infra notes 99-113 (discussing individual
recovery in derivative cases). For an example of such extraordinary circumstances, see
Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 349 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that "the so-called bonuses [paid to controlling shareholders] merely constituted a
dividing of surplus profits" and ordering that the plaintiff be paid his share according
to his percentage of stock ownership). The Murphy court based its holding on two key
factual premises: "No evidence appears which suggests that the Board [of Directors]
reviewed the quality of work performed or the number of hours worked before
approving these 'bonuses' .... [T]he corporation instead distributed 'bonuses' only
when fiscal reports showed sufficient income in the prior years." Id.
24. This phenomenon creates an interesting overlap with employment law. See
Deborah A. Schmedemann, Fired Employee and/or Frozen-out Shareholders, 22 WM.
MrrCHELL L. REV. 1435, 1447 (1996) (accompanying symposium article in this issue).
25. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3a (1994) (directing that in considering
appropriate relief in the context of closely held corporations, courts should take into
account the reasonable expectations of shareholders). Many otherjurisdictions also use
the reasonable expectations standard. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 484 N.Y.S.2d
799, 802 (N.Y. 1984); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983);
Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1208 [Vol. 22
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ful termination injures such shareholders directly, "in their
capacities... as officers or employees of a closely held corpora-
tion."26
There are both case law and statutory sources for direct
claims in Minnesota close corporations. Minnesota courts have
stated that Minnesota law "imposes on each [shareholder in a
close corporation] the highest standard of integrity in their
dealings with each other."27 The courts describe this duty as
a "fiduciary duty to deal openly, honestly and fairly with other
shareholders," which is akin to the duty imposed upon partners
in a partnership.2" As is the case with general partnerships,
conduct breaching this duty entitles the victim to bring a claim
directly against the malefactor.29
In Evans v. Blesi,30 for example, a minority shareholder in
a close corporation brought a direct action alleging that the
1979), affd, 414 A.2d 994 (NJ. Super. App. Div. May 2, 1980), and cert. denied, 425 A.2d
273 (N.J.July 15, 1980); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662-
63 (Mass. 1976).
26. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b) (3) (authorizing an action by a shareholder
when those in control of the corporation have unfairly prejudiced the shareholder in
any one of several specified capacities); see also App. A, Fig. 1. See, e.g., Pooley v.
Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. App.), petitionfor review denied,
(Minn. 1994); Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App.), petition for review
denied, (Minn. 1992); Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Evans v.
Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, (Minn. 1984); Sawyer
v. Curt & Co., Nos. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12,
1991), petition for review denied, (Minn. Apr. 18, 1991).
27. Evans, 345 N.W.2d at 779.
28. Id.; see also Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 709, 712
(Minn. 1981) (describing a close corporation as "a partnership in corporate guise").
29. See, e.g., Wenzel v. Madhies, 542 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. Ct. App.) (holding
that directors breached their fiduciary dudes by improperly issuing and selling new
stock to themselves and thereby destroying the plaintiff-pledgees controlling interest in
the closely held corporation), petition for review denied, (Minn. 1996); Pedro, 489 N.W.2d
at 801-02 (holding that defendant-shareholders in close corporation breached fiduciary
duties owed to plaintiff-shareholder by harassing and firing plaintiff after he insisted on
resolving discrepancies in financial records); Henricksen v. Big League Game Co., No.
CO-95-388, 1195 WL 550935, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1995) (holding that
directors of a close corporation breached their fiduciary duties by selling newly issued
stock and corporate assets without notice to the plaintiff-shareholder and without
authorization by the board of directors). As for partner versus partner claims, see Prince
v. Sonneson, 222 Minn. 528, 533-34, 25 N.W.2d 468, 471-72 (1947) (holding that
partner breached his fiduciary duties by using fraudulent misrepresentations to
persuade other partners to agree to convert the partnership into a corporation). As
indicated, supra note 1, most partner versus partner claims are litigated in the context
of an action for an accounting.
30. 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
1996]
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majority shareholder had used intimidating and abusive tactics
to coerce the minority shareholder into transferring stock to the
majority shareholder and then into resigning."' From 1955 to
1977, the plaintiff and defendant had been equal shareholders
in the Blesi-Evans Company.12  In 1977, however, the plaintiff
had transferred a share of stock to the defendant, giving the
defendant a majority interest.33 In 1981, the plaintiff acqui-
esced to the defendant's demands that the plaintiff resign from
his employment with the corporation. 4 The plaintiff later
claimed that the defendant had forced him to transfer the stock
by throwing tantrums and threatening to liquidate the corpora-
tion should the plaintiff refuse. 5 The plaintiff also testified
that the defendant had threatened to fire his son (who worked
for the company) unless the plaintiff resigned." The court
found that the defendant's actions constituted a breach of a
fiduciary duty owed directly to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff
had suffered a correspondingly direct injury.
3 7
More recent cases tend to rest primarily on a statute enacted
in 1981, Minnesota Statutes section 302A.751. 8 Recognizing
31. Id. at 777.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 778.
34. Id. at 777.
35. Id. at 778.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 775. In addition to ordering the defendant shareholder to buy out the
minority shareholder, the court awarded the minority shareholder $381,136 in
compensatory damages for lost salary and $250,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 781.
38. 1981 Minn. Laws ch. 270,'§ 108. The legislature amended section 302A.751
four times from 1981 to 1996. See 1982 Minn. Laws ch. 497, § 65 (amending
§ 302A.751, subd. 2 by instructing the court when ordering a buy-out to defer to
negotiated buy-out agreements, unless the terms or conditions are unreasonable); 1982
Minn. Laws ch. 497, § 66 (amending § 302A.751, subd. 3 by inserting reference to
equitable relief and buy-outs); 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 368, § 9 (amending § 302A.751,
subd. 1(b) by substituting as grounds for relief the phrase "in a manner unfairly
prejudicial" for the phrase "persistently unfair"); 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 368, § 9
(amending § 302A.751, subd. 2 by substituting "closely held corporation" for
"corporation having 25 or fewer shareholders"); 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 368, § 11 (amend-
ing § 302A.751 by inserting subd. 3a which instructs courts to take into consideration
the "reasonable expectations of the shareholders"); 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 431, § 3
(amending § 302A.751 by inserting subd. 3b which instructs the courts to consider
lesser relief before ordering dissolution as a remedy); 1994 Minn. Laws ch. 417, § 9
(amending § 302A.751, subd. 1 by deleting action relating to unfairly prejudicial acts
from clause 2 and adding clause 3 regarding actions relating solely to unfairly
prejudicial acts toward shareholders); 1994 Minn. Laws ch. 417, § 10 (amending
§ 302A.751, subd. 2 substituting "a corporation that is not a publicly held corporation"
1210 [Vol. 22
DIRECT VS. DERIVATIVE
the vulnerability of minority shareholders in a close corporation,
the statute accords them special protections. It specifies several
grounds for judicial intervention and provides a panoply of
equitable remedies.3 9 For the close corporAtion claimant, the
key grounds are found in clauses 2 and 3 of subdivision 1 (b).
Under these clauses:
A court may grant any equitable relief it deems just and
reasonable in the circumstances or may dissolve a corporation
and liquidate its assets and business:
(b) In an action by a shareholder when it is estab-
for "a closely held corporation"); 1994 Minn. Laws ch. 417, § 11 (amending § 302A.751,
subd. 3a by adding a presumption that written agreements, including employment
agreements and buy-sell agreements, reflect the parties' reasonable expectations).
For cases invoking Minnesota Statutes § 302A.751, see McCallum v. Rosen's
Diversified, Inc., 41 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1994); Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774,
779 (8th Cir. 1993); PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Minn. 1990);
Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21-22 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), petition for review denied,
(Minn. Feb. 27, 1996); Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834, 837
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994), petition for review denied, (Minn. May 17, 1994); Pedro v. Pedro,
489 N.W.2d 798, 802-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), petition for review denied, (Minn. Oct. 20,
1992); In re Telesports Prod., Inc., 476 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Pedro
v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289-90 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Warthan v. Midwest Consol.
Ins. Agencies, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 145, 148-49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Sundberg v. Abbott,
423 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), petition for review denied, (Minn. June 29,
1988); Casey v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986),
petition for review denied, (Minn. Oct. 29, 1986); Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390
N.W.2d 352, 355-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), petition for review denied, (Minn. Sept. 22,
1986); Schaub v. Kortgard, 372 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Henricksen v.
Big League Games Co., No. CO-95-388, 1995 WL 550935, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 19,
1995); Olsen v. Drozdek, No. C2-92-1706, 1993 WL 107756, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
13, 1993); Wheeler v. McGee, No. C5-92-680, 1992 WL 383460, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 29, 1992), petition for review denied, (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993); Kelley v. Rudd, No. C7-
91-1142, 1992 WL 3651, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1992), petition for review denied,
(Minn. Mar. 26, 1992); Dullea v. Dullea Co., No. C8-91-498, 1991 WL 271479, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1991), petition for review denied, (Minn. Feb. 19, 1992); Sawyer
v. Curt & Co., Nos. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320, at *1-3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 12, 1991); Bowman v. MWCG Export Co., No. C4-90-1654, 1991 WL 30342, at *2
(Minn. CL App. Mar. 12, 1991); Zenanko v. Vukelich, No. C2-90-1264, 1991 WL 6379,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1991); Johnson v. Dolphin, No. CX-90-718, 1990 WL
194991, at *1-2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1990), petition for review denied (Minn. Feb. 6,
1991); Blaeser v. Dufour, No. CO-89-2102, 1990 WL 128296, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept.
11, 1990), petition for review denied, (Minn. Nov. 9, 1990); Chabot v. Industrial Relations
Council, Inc., No. C8-90-300, 1990 WL 119371, at *1-2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1990);
Koropchak v. Multicare Assoc., No. C7-89-2047, 1990 WL 48538, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 24, 1990).
39. Joseph E. Olson, Statutoy Changes Improve Position of Minority Shareholders in
Closey-Held Corporations, HENNEPIN LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 10.
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lished that:
(2) the directors or those in control of the
corporation have acted fraudulently or illegally
toward one or more shareholders in their capaci-
ties as shareholders or directors, or as officers or
employees of a closely held cQrporation; [or]
(3) the directors or those in control of the
corporation have acted in a manner unfairly
prejudicial toward one or more shareholders in
their capacities as shareholders or directors of a
corporation that is not a publicly held corpora-
tion, or as officers or employees of a closely held
corporation. °
A direct suit typically names not only the corporation but
also individual directors and shareholders as defendants. The
corporation is a proper and often even a necessary party,
because often the corporation takes the formal action which
effects the injury. Moreover, the corporation is typically the
source or focus of the requested relief. For example, although
as a practical matter it will be the majority shareholder who
decides to fire a minority shareholder,4' formally speaking it is
the corporation that terminates the shareholder's employ-
ment.2 A fired shareholder might respond by seeking to
dissolve the corporation" or to compel the corporation to
redeem the shareholder's stock.44 As for individual defendants,
40. The syntax of these two clauses makes their meaning and relationship difficult
to decipher. The charts contained in Appendix A analyze and restate these clauses to
make them more accessible. As for clause 's reference to "unfair prejudice," the cases
interpret the term in light of § 302A.751, subd. 3, which discusses considerations in
granting relief involving closely held corporations. See, e.g., Pedro, 489 N.W.2d at 802;
Warthan, 450 N.W.2d at 149; Kelley, 1992 WL 3651 at *3; Sawyer, 1991 WL 65320 at *2.
41. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 239 (N.Y. 1934) (Lehman, J.,
concurring in the result) ("The theory that directors [in close corporations] exercise
in all matters an independent judgment in practice often yields to the fact that the
choice of directors lies with the majority stockholders and the thus gives the
stockholders a very effective control of the action by the board of directors.").
42. See supra notes 24-26.
43. See infra note 47.
44. Minnesota Statutes § 302A.751, subdivision 2 provides "[i]n an
action . . . involving a corporation that is not a publicly held corporation . .. the court
may upon motion of... a shareholder. . . order the sale [by an injured shareholder]
of all shares of the corporation held by [such injured shareholder to] the corporation."
MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 2. For either of these remedies, due process and the
rules of civil procedure require that the corporation be a party. See TIMOTHY P. BJUR
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section 302A.751 specifically refers to misconduct by "the
directors or those in control of the corporation"45 and expressly
recognizes direct, shareholder-to-shareholder duties.'
Remedies from a direct claim benefit the shareholder
plaintiff directly and vary depending upon the severity of the
misconduct and the other circumstances of the case. A court
may order a buy-out of the injured shareholder's shares or grant
any other equitable relief, including dissolution of the corpora-
tion.47  Plaintiff's counsel is not automatically entitled to
attorney's fees. The statute provides that, "[i]f the court finds
that a party to a proceeding brought under this section has acted
arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith, it may in
its discretion award reasonable expenses, including attorneys'
& JAMES SOLHEIM, 13 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
§ 4473, at 78 (perm ed. 1995).
45. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subds. 1 (b) (2), (3). See also infra App. A, Fig. 1.
46. Minnesota Statutes § 302A.751, subdivision 3a refers to "the duty which all
shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair,
and reasonable manner in the operation of the corporation." See also Chabot v. Indus-
trial Relations Council, Inc., No. C8-90-300, 1990 WL 119371, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Aug. 21, 1990). The court found that:
Under the Business Corporations Act, the remedies of Minn.
Star. § 302A.751 are made readily available to the district court.
'Abuse of non-controlling shareholders is not to be tolerated under
this act; section 302A.467 and this section stand as evidence of that
policy.' Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751, general comment, 1981.
The trial court followed this directive and Minn. Stat. § 302A.467
in imposing remedies against Jones individually.
Id.
47. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A-751, subd. 1 (recognizing broad equitable powers), subd.
2 (delineating the buy-out remedy). In 1986, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that
subdivision 2's then reference to "closely-held corporation" confined the buy-out remedy
to cases involving closely held corporations. Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390
N.W.2d 352, 356 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), petition for review denied, (Minn. Sept. 22, 1986).
See Kleinberger, supra note 9, at 1157 n.40 (criticizing Lampert Lumber). Arguably at
least, the 1986 enactment of subdivision 3b overturned Lampert Lumber. That
subdivision mentioned buy-outs without any reference to closely held corporations.
1986 Minn. Laws ch. 431, § 3. In any event, in 1994 the legislature settled the matter
beyond doubt, amending subdivision 2 to make the buy-out remedy available in any
corporation other than a publicly held corporation. 1994 Minn. Laws ch. 417, § 10.
Both case law and the statute disfavor the extreme remedy of liquidation. See, e.g.,
In re Involuntary Dissolution of Lakeland Dev. Corp. v. Anderson, 277 Minn. 432, 442,
152 N.W.2d 758, 765 (1967) ("the court should grant the drastic remedy of dissolution
with great caution and not in doubtful cases"); MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3b
(providing that "[i]n deciding whether to order dissolution, the court shall consider
whether lesser relief suggested by one or more parties, such as any form of equitable
relief, a buy-out, or a partial liquidation, would be adequate to permanently relieve the
circumstances").
1996]
WILLIAM MITCHEL. LAW REVIEW
fees and disbursements, to any of the other parties. "'
B. Derivative Claims
In contrast, a shareholder asserts a derivative claim to
vindicate the rights of the corporation. A wrongful act has
depleted or devalued corporate assets or has undercut the
corporate business. The shareholder has suffered harm only
indirectly, as a consequence of damage done to the corporation.
The wrongful conduct relates to the shareholder only through
the medium of the corporation, i.e., by reducing the value of the
shareholder's stock. For example, when those in control of the
corporation act negligently,4 or waste or misappropriate
corporate assets, it is the corporation, not the shareholder, that
first suffers the loss.5 ° Likewise, if a corporate director takes for
48. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 4; see also Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 804
(Minn. Ct App. 1992) (holding award of attorneys' fees to plaintiff minority
shareholder under § 302A.751, subdivision 4 was not an abuse of discretion), petition for
review denied, (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992); Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Nos. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041,
1991 WL 65320, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991) (holding that Minnesota Statutes
§ 302A.467 (1988) "permits a court, in its discretion, to award attorney fees for any
violation of chapter 302A if it finds such an award will be reasonably equitable under
the circumstances. No specific findings as to bad faith, arbitrary, or vexatious conduct
are required."), petition for review denied, (Minn. Apr. 18, 1991).
49. Warnerv. E. C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565,571-72, 33 N.W.2d 721,726 (1948);
Horn Silver Mining Co. v. Ryan, 42 Minn. 196, 198-99, 44 N.W. 56, 57 (1889); Lampert
Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d at 357. In theory, the standard of care for directors of
Minnesota corporations is higher than the standard for Delaware directors. Compare
MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 1 (requiring "the care an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would exercise under similar circumstances") with Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (establishing a standard of gross negligence).
The difference may be more apparent than real, however. Minnesota's statutory
standard seems not to have disturbed caselaw's historic deference to the business
judgment of directors, see infra part III.C. (discussing the business judgment rule), and
Delaware has applied its seemingly more lax standard in ways that have shocked the
corporate bar. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Law, Changes in the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act - Amendment Pertaining to the Liability of Directors, 45 BUS. LAw 695,
696 (1989-1990); Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1, 7 (1989) (explaining how Smith v.
Van Gorkom shocked corporate practitioners and led to the enactment of statutes
protecting directors against negligence-based liability); see also Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 370-71 (Del. 1993) (rejecting the notion that plaintiffs
must prove a causal link between directors' negligence and damage to the corporation
and holding that, once plaintiffs have established a breach of directors' duty of care,
directors have the burden of proving the entire fairness of the challenged transaction).
Moreover, exculpatory provisions, discussed infra part III.E., may moot any difference.
50. See, e.g., Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn. 1982) (involving, inter
alia, waste of corporate assets); Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union, 259 Minn. 257,
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him or herself a business opportunity that properly belongs to
the corporation, it is the corporation, not the shareholder, that
has lost the opportunity and any attendant profits.51
In essence, a derivative plaintiff seeks to derive standing
from the injury to the corporation and to represent the corpora-
tion's interests in the derivative lawsuit.52  In ordinary circum-
stances, " [w] hether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in
the courts a cause of action for damages is, like other business
questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management and is left
to the discretion of the directors.""3 A derivative lawsuit,
therefore, necessarily impugns the management of the corpora-
tion and inevitably involves two distinct fights. One fight
concerns the underlying transaction or conduct, which is alleged
to have caused some harm or breached some duty to the
corporation. The other fight concerns who will control the
corporation for the limited purpose of seeking a remedy for the
alleged misconduct.
54
The typical derivative suit alleges that, with regard to the
underlying transaction, the corporation's own directors have
acted improperly.55  To support such claims, a derivative
plaintiff, like a direct plaintiff, can turn to both common and
261, 107 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1961) (involving misappropriation of corporate assets);
Warner v. E. C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565, 569, 33 N.W.2d 721, 724 (1948) (involving,
inter alia, waste of corporate assets); Eriksson v. Boyum, 150 Minn. 192, 194, 184 N.W.
961, 962 (1921) (involving, inter alia, misappropriation of corporate assets); Seitz v.
Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 83, 181 N.W. 102, 103 (1921) (involving, inter alia, misappropria-
tion of corporate assets); Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (involving, inter alia, misappropriation of corporate assets), petition for review
denied, (Minn. Aug. 24, 1988).
51. Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 220-21, 222 N.W.2d 71, 79 (1974).
52. Warner, 226 Minn. at 569, 33 N.W.2d at 724 ("In a representative suit [by a
stockholder in behalf of his corporation] .... the stockholder bringing the action is
merely a representative party so far as the corporation is concerned.").
53. Westgor, 318 N.W.2d at 59.
54. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). The Auerbach court's
inquiry had "a two-tiered aspect." Id. at 1000. The plaintiff's "complaint initially
asserted liability on the part of defendants [the corporate directors] based on [bribes,]
•.. i.e., the focus was on first-tier bribes and kickbacks." Id. The second-tier inquiry
involved the report of a special litigation committee, its appointment "by the
[defendant] corporation's board of directors to consider the merits of the present and
similar shareholders' derivative actions, and its determination that it would not be in
the best interest of the corporation to press claims against defendants based on their
possible first-tier liability." Id. For a discussion of the dynamics of this latter fight, see
infra part IIlA-B.
55. See infra notes 59-69.
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statutory law. Minnesota case law has long recognized that
"directors or controlling shareholders stand in a fiduciary
relationship to the corporation."56 The courts have described
this fiduciary relationship as "one imposing upon them the duty
to exercise their powers as directors solely for the benefit of the
corporation and its stockholders."5 7  In addition, case law
recognizes a duty of care, although the requirements of that duty
vary somewhat within the cases."
A pair of cases reflecting a director's duty of loyalty (i.e.,
selflessness) illustrate the power of case-law-based claims. In
Westgor v. Grimm, the plaintiff argued inter alia that the directors
had wrongfully enriched themselves through corporate ac-
tions. 9 The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that, in order to
establish a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, "a plaintiff must
allege facts which show that the action attacked is so far opposed
to the true interests of the corporation as to lead to the clear
inference that no officer thus acting could have been influenced
by an honest desire to secure such interest."' The trial court
had dismissed plaintiff's claim, finding no breach of fiduciary
duty. The supreme court reversed and remanded, directing the
trial court to determine whether the defendants had breached
a fiduciary duty by paying themselves back salaries and selling a
model home to a director.61
The plaintiff's allegations suggested that the directors had
acted with a conflict of interest. Once such a conflict is estab-
56. Westgor, 318 N.W.2d at 59. See Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152
Minn. 460, 462, 189 N.W. 586, 587 (1922) ("This court has continually insisted upon
the recognition of the fiduciary relation between officers and directors and stockholders
... ."); Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 67. 162 N.W.
1056, 1057 (1917) ("The position is one of trust and confidence, the duties thereof
must be performed with fidelity.... ."); Horn Silver Mining Co. v. Ryan, 42 Minn. 196,
198, 44 N.W. 56, 56 (1889) ("The directors of a corporation are its agents and occupy
a fiduciary relation to it.").
57. Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 493, 14 N.W.2d 913, 919 (1944).
58. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing the schizoid attitude
of Minnesota law with regard to the business judgment rule and the duty of care).
59. Westgor, 318 N.W.2d at 58. The plaintiff also argued that the directors had
breached a duty by failing to sue the corporation's attorney for negligent tax advice.
Id. The supreme court rejected that claim, stating that "[w] hether or not a corporation
shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action for damages is, like other business
questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management and is left to the discretion of
the directors." Id. at 59.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 58-59.
[Vol. 22
DIRECT VS. DERIVATIVE
lished, the court explained, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant directors:
[The directors'] dealings with the corporation are subjected
to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or
engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden
is on the director or stockholder not only to prove good faith
of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from
the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested ....
The essence of the test is whether or not under all the
circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an
arm's length bargain.62
Miller v. Mille43 reflects another aspect of the duty of
loyalty-the corporate opportunity doctrine. A minority
shareholder brought a derivative suit alleging that two of the
shareholder-managers had appropriated for themselves a
business opportunity properly belonging to the corporation.
The defendants had formed other corporations and a partner-
ship which then performed tasks related to the first corporation's
business.' 4
The supreme court articulated a two-part test for determin-
ing when liability exists for usurpation of a corporate opportuni-
ty. The first part determines whether the business opportunity
at issue is a "corporate" opportunity.65 To constitute a "corpo-
rate" opportunity, the business taken must be sufficiently.
associated with the existing or prospective activities of the
corporation as to be in fact in its "line of business. "66 If not,
62. Id. at 59. Westgor was both a derivative and direct suit. The court dismissed
plaintiff's direct claim, finding that plaintiff had "no individual cause of action because
a right of action for diversion of corporate funds is in the corporation, not the
individual." Id. at 58 (citing Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102 (1921)).
63. 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974).
64. Id. at 208, 222 N.W.2d at 72-73.
65. Id. at 225, 222 N.W.2d at 81.
66. Id. Significant factors to be considered when making this determination
include:
[1] whether the business opportunity presented is one in which the complain-
ing corporation has an interest or an expectancy growing out of an existing
contractual right; [2] the relationship of the opportunity to the corporation's
business purposes and current activities-whether essential, necessary, or
merely desirable to its reasonable needs and aspirations-; [3] whether, within
or without its corporate powers, the opportunity embraces areas adaptable to
its business and into which the corporation might easily, naturally, or logically
expand; [4] the competitive nature of the opportunity-whether prospectively
harmful or unfair-; [5] whether the corporation, by reason of insolvency or
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the analysis ends with a finding of no liability.67 If so, the
analysis proceeds to the second part. The second part of the test
determines whether the corporate director, in acquiring the
corporate opportunity, violated his or her fiduciary duties of
loyalty, good faith and fair dealing toward the corporation."
Significant factors to be considered when making this determina-
tion include:
[T] he nature of the officer's relationship to the management
and control of the corporation; whether the opportunity was
presented to him in his official or individual capacity; his
prior disclosure of the opportunity to the board of directors
or shareholders and their response; whether or not he used
or exploited corporate facilities, assets, or personnel in
acquiring the opportunity; whether his acquisition harmed or
benefited [sic] the corporation, and all other facts and
circumstances bearing on the officer's good faith and whether
he exercised the diligence, devotion, care, and fairness
toward the corporation which ordinarily prudent men would
exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.69
lack of resources, has the financial ability to acquire the opportunity; and [6]
whether the opportunity includes activities as to which the corporation has
fundamental knowledge, practical experience, facilities, equipment, personnel,
and the ability to pursue.
Id.
67. Id. Liability could, however, be imposed on some other, independent theory.
For example, an opportunity might be outside a corporation's line of business as
defined by Miller but still come within the confines of a non-competition obligation
established by contract. See id.
68. Id. at 225-26, 222 N.W.2d at 81-82.
69. Id. Neither bad nor good faith is dispositive in the fairness analysis:
We are not to be understood, by adopting this two-step process, as
suggesting that a finding of bad faith is essential to impose liability
upon the acquiring officer. Nor, conversely, that good faith alone
apart from the officer's fiduciary duty requiring loyalty and fair
dealing toward the corporation, will absolve him from liability.
Id. at 226, 222 N.W.2d at 82.
The first part of the Miller test conforms with the standards used in many other
jurisdictions. The second part is unique. In other jurisdictions, taking a corporate
opportunity is per se wrongful, unless the director can show that the corporation
knowingly consented. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 2 A.2d 225, 238-39 (Del. Ch. 1938),
aft'd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). The Guth court held:
Such are the fiduciary duties and obligations of an officer and
director of a corporation that if a business opportunity comes to him
which is in the line of his corporation's activities and of advantage to
it... the law will not allow him to divert the opportunity from the
corporation and embrace it as his own.
Id. The second part of the Miller test has been severely criticized. See Victor Brudney
& Robert C. Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV, L. REV. 997, 998-99
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A derivative suit may also assert statute-based claims, because
Minnesota Statutes sections 302A.251 and 302A.255 impose
duties of care and loyalty on those who control and manage the
corporation. Section 302A.251, subdivision 1 establishes a
general standard of both loyalty and due care: "A director shall
discharge the duties of the position of director in good faith, in
a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and with the care of an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances."
70
The provision clearly contemplates judicial enforcement,71
and Minnesota courts have acted accordingly. For example, in
PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund,72 the court remanded to allow
further consideration of breach of fiduciary claims and referred
to section 302A.251 as one of several grounds on which the
plaintiffs might challenge the defendants' actions."
Section 302A.251 figured in both the trial court and
appeals court decisions in Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co.74 An
extended family owned a controlling interest in the corporation,
and the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated
section 302A.251 by redeeming stock owned by a member of the
controlling family without giving the decision adequate consider-
ation.75 The trial court found that the directors had breached
section 302A.251, but the court of appeals reversed. The appeals
n.2 (1981).
70. MiNN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 1 (1994). Section 302A-361 provides an
identical standard for the conduct of officers: "An officer shall discharge the duties of
an office in good faith, in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances." MINN. STAT. § 302A.361 (1994).
71. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 1. The subdivision's last sentence states: "A
person who so performs those duties is not liable by reason of being or having been a
director of the corporation." Id.
72. 453 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1990).
73. Id. at 13. The alleged breaches related to transfers of corporate stock and a
right of first refusal. Id. at 3.
74. 390 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct App. 1986), petition for review denied, (Minn. Sept.
22, 1986).
75. See id. at 356. The board redeemed the family member's stock for $1.2 million.
Id. at 354. The minutes of the board reflected no discussion concerning the particulars
of the redemption, and no information or reports were prepared or presented to the
board for its consideration. Id. The board's decision to redeem was precipitated by the
shareholder's increasing use of her corporate account to pay for personal items. Id. at
354-55. No shareholder vote was taken on the matter. Id. at 354.
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panel did not dispute the relevance of section 302A.251 but
rather concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove causa-
tion.76  The court of appeals explained: "Even when the
required duty of care has not been exercised, the directors,
officer, or controlling shareholders are only liable, under
causation rules of negligence law, for such loss to the corpora-
tion as was caused by their negligence."77
Causation is not an issue under Minnesota Statutes section
302A.255, which speaks specifically to director conflict-of-interest
problems and rests on a common law background that presumed
self-dealing transactions to be voidable at the instance of the
corporation. 7' The statute's first subdivision identifies "con-
flicts" and addresses the proper "procedure when conflict
arises."79  The statute provides three protections against
voidability. Two are effectively safe-harbors: (i) informed
consent by disinterested shareholders;8" and (ii) informed
consent by disinterested directors." The third protection
76. Id. at 357.
77. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). Compare Lampert Lumber with
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A-2d 345, 370-71 (Del. 1993) (sharply criticizing
the causation approach and holding that, under Delaware law, once the plaintiffs prove
a breach of the duty of care the defendants have the burden of proving entire fairness).
78. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality,
22 Bus. LAW 35, 36 (1966) ("In 1880 it could have been stated with confidence that in
the United States the general rule was that any contract between a director and his
corporation was voidable at the instance of the corporation or its shareholders, without
regard to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction.").
79. MINN. STAT. § 302A.255, subd. 1 (1994). The quoted language is from the
caption. Subdivision 2 further defines conflicts by excluding certain transactions and
by establishing family attribution rules. Id. at subd. 2.
80. Section 302A.255, subdivision 1 provides that a conflict-of-interest transaction
"is not void or voidable" if:
(b) The material facts as to the contract or transaction and as to the
director's or directors' interest are fully disclosed or known to the
shareholders and the contract or transaction is approved in good
faith by (1) the holders of two-thirds of the voting power of the
shares entitled to vote which are owned by persons other than the
interested director or directors, or (2) the unanimous affirmative
vote of the holders of all outstanding shares, whether or not entitled
to vote.
Id. at subd. (1) (b). Clause 2 is evidently intended to allow this safe-harbor to function
when all the outstanding voting shares are held by interested directors.
81. Section 302A.255, subdivision 1 (c) provides that a conflict-of-interest transaction
"is not void or voidable" if:
(c) The material facts as to the contract or transaction and as to the
director's or directors' interest are fully disclosed or known to the
board or a committee, and the board or committee authorizes,
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requires "the person asserting the validity of the contract or
transaction [to sustain] the burden of establishing that the
contract or transaction was fair and reasonable to the corpora-
"182tion.
As is the situation with section 302A.251, the language of
section 302A.255 bespeaks judicial enforceability. The introduc-
tory language in subdivision 1 alludes to "void or voidable
transactions," which argues ultimately for a judicial determina-
tion. Moreover, paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 refers specifically
to a burden of proof."
Minnesota courts have invoked section 302A.255 on a
number of occasions. For example, in PJ Acquisition the court
refers to section 302A.255 as one of several grounds on which
the plaintiffs might challenge the defendants' actions.8 4 In
Chabot v. Industrial Relations Council, Inc.,85 the court held that
a board member deemed interested under section 302A.255
could not be counted toward a quorum when the board voted to
have the corporation acquire her shares.86
Whatever the source of claim, a derivative action will
necessarily involve both the corporation and individual defen-
dants as parties. Since it is the corporation that has been
directly harmed, its interests are fundamentally involved in any
attempt to remedy those harms. By case law, the corporation is
approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction in good faith by a
majority of the board or committee, but the interested director or
directors shall not be counted in determining the presence of a
quorum and shall not vote.
Id. at subd. 1 (c).
82. Id. at subd. 1 (a), This provision is not a safe-harbor because it provides no
clearly defined, mechanical rule under which a transaction's proponents can act ante
hoc to follow clearly specified procedures or satisfy clearly specified requirements.
Actions taken ante hoc, such as independent fairness opinions, can increase the
likelihood of a transaction being fair and, more importantly, being adjudged as having
been fair, but cannot inspire the level of confidence created by compliance with the
mechanical requirements of a true safe-harbor.
83. Id.
84. PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 17-18 (Minn. 1990).
85. No. C8-90-300, 1990 WL 119371 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1990).
86. Id. *2. See Possis Corp. v. Continental Mach., Inc., 425 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988), petition for review denied, (Minn. July 28, 1988). In Possis, the parties
disputed whether section 302A.255 disqualified "interested" directors from being
counted towards a quorum when the board voted to exercise a purchase option. Id. at
289-90. The court avoided the issue and based its decision on other grounds. Id.
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a necessary party.8 7  The individual defendants will be those
who have allegedly harmed the corporation. In the typical
derivative suit, those individuals are or have been in control of
the corporation. 8 In such situations, the same defendants will
figure in both of the two aspects of the derivative suit&--i.e., in
the allegations that the defendants have harmed the corporation
through their misconduct, and in the allegations that defendants
cannot be relied on to pursue those miscreants who have
harmed the corporation (i.e., themselves)." ° A derivative suit
can also target an outsider to the corporation. In that event, the
derivative suit asserts that the outsider has harmed the corpora-
tion and that those in control of the corporation have wrongfully
failed to pursue the outsider.91
Whoever the parties may be, remedies granted in a deriva-
tive suit ordinarily benefit the corporation. As the Minnesota
Supreme Court explained in the context of a suit claiming a
breach of the duty of loyalty, "[t]he wrongs complained of are
wrongs against the corporation. The funds diverted should be
restored to the corporations [sic]."9 The same is true regard-
less of whether the suit recovers damages for breach of the duty
of care,93 imposes a constructive trust or requires disgorgement
87. BJUR & SOLHEIM, supra note 44, § 5998, at 245. The corporation is styled as a
nominal defendant. Warner v. E. C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565, 569, 33 N.W.2d 721,
724 (1948). As the supreme court explained:
In a representative or derivative suit, the real controversy is between
the corporation and the officer whose acts are complained of. The
corporation is the beneficial plaintiff, even though it is made a
defendant, while the stockholder bringing the action is merely a
representative party so far as the corporation is concerned.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. See Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance - The Role of Special Litigation
Committees, 68 WAsH. L. REv. 79, 102, 134 (1993); Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder
Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Bal 77 MINN. L. REV.
1339, 1344 (1993).
89. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 998 (N.Y. 1979) (involving a
derivative suit against directors for breach of fiduciary duty). In Auerbach, the plaintiff
shareholder contended that "any committee authorized by the board of which
defendant directors were members must be held legally infirm." Id. at 1001.
91. Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Minn. 1982) (plaintiff alleged
controlling shareholders "breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation by failing
to assert a claim against [the corporation's] former attorney").
92. Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 87, 181 N.W. 102, 105 (1921).
93. Lake Harriet State Bank v. Venie, 138 Minn. 339, 347, 165 N.W. 225, 229
(1917) (stating that corporate directors "are liable to the corporation for any losses
resulting from.., neglect of duty"); Horn Silver Mining Co. v. Ryan, 42 Minn. 196, 198-
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for a usurpation of corporate opportunity 4 or effects rescission
of a transaction tainted by self-dealing.95 Just as the claim
belongs to the corporation, so too does the relief.
There are some exceptions, however. In rare cases, courts
have ordered that dividends be paid out to shareholders from
the funds recovered by the corporation." Such an order
intrudes into the core of directors' discretion and reflects a
judicial determination that dividends have been or will be
withheld for unlawful reasons.97 As the Minnesota Supreme
Court explained:
While it is true that the courts cannot ordinarily compel a
corporation to declare a dividend at the suit of minority
stockholder, yet it is not to be doubted that where dividends
are withheld for an unlawful purpose-to deprive a particular
stockholder of his rights-he may have the aid of equity for
adequate protection."
99, 44 N.W. 56, 56 (1889) (ruling that "directors of a moneyed
corporation... are ... liable if they suffer the corporate funds or property to be lost
or wasted by gross negligence and inattention to the duties of their trust").
94. Klinicki v. Lundgren, 678 P.2d 1250, 1254 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
a constructive trust is an appropriate remedy in a derivative suit where defendants
wrongfully usurped a corporate opportunity), affd, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985). Several
Minnesota cases assert the principle that if "a business opportunity is usurped for
personal gain, . . . the opportunity and any property or profit acquired becomes subject
to a constructive trust for the benefit of the corporation." However, these cases found
no usurpation. See Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 219-20, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (1974);
Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 493, 14 N.W.2d 913, 919 (1944); Boxrud v. Ronning
Mach. Co., 217 Minn. 518, 520, 15 N.W.2d 112, 114 (1944).
95. Shaw v. Staight, 107 Minn. 152, 157-58, 119 N.W. 951,953 (1909) (ordering the
defendant directors to rescind the transfer of stock to another director, where the
transfer had been made in exchange for worthless assets).
96. See, e.g., Crowley v. Communications for Hosps., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 996, 1006
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (holding trial court erred in ordering direct relief to minority
shareholder for misappropriated corporate funds and instead ordering majority
shareholders to declare a dividend once misappropriated funds were returned to the
corporation), petition for review denied, (Mass. July 30, 1991).
97. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919). This classic case
first notes that the decision whether to declare dividends is at the core of the directors'
discretion, but then adds:
[I] t is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape
and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental
benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting
others, and no one will contend that, if the avowed purpose of the
defendant directors [is] to sacrifice the interests of shareholders, it
would not be the duty of the courts to interfere.
Id. at 684.
98. Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 205 Minn. 96, 121, 285 N.W. 809, 823 (1939)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v. W. J. Dyer & Bro., 94 Minn.
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Sometimes the same rationale leads courts to provide direct,
individual recovery in a derivative suit.99  As the court ex-
plained in Backus v. Finkelstein:°°
For obvious reasons, it may be highly improper to direct that
the moneys here recovered on behalf of the corporation shall
be paid into the treasury thereof. That might be paying the
moneys back into the custody and control of those from
whom the recovery is had. It might defeat effectually the
purpose of the suit and be the beginning of another pro-
longed cycle of litigation.' °
Perlman v. Feldmann reflects a variation on that theme. °
Minority shareholders brought a derivative action against the
majority shareholder who had sold his control block at a
premium.10 3  The corporation manufactured steel, and the
stock sale occurred during the Korean War.0 4 Steel was in
short supply, and the government had imposed price con-
trols.105 The majority shareholder sold his stock to a consor-
tium of steel users, who were then able to control to their
benefit the allocation of the corporation's steel production. 6
Due to the price controls, the corporation lost no money. It did,
30, 35, 101 N.W. 1061, 1062 (1904)).
99. Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1130-31 (Wyo. 1985) (ordering direct
recovery because corporate recovery would simply return funds to the control of the
wrongdoers and would risk necessitating a subsequent suit by minority shareholders to
compel directors to declare dividend); Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357, 366 (D. Minn.
1927) (ordering the appointment of a trustee to act under the direction of the court
and receive the funds recovered from the defendants and disburse those funds among
the plaintiffs and others who prove that they are within the same class as the plaintiffs).
But see Crowley, 573 N.E.2d at 1004 (holding the "finding of a 'freeze out' scheme may
well be an element of a case for direct relief, but it is not necessarily sufficient to
preclude the need for derivative relief"); Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610 (Del.
Ch. 1974) (derivative action to recover excess compensation received by defendant as
president of corporation and direct action to compel payments of dividends; defendant
ordered to repay excess compensation and the decision whether to pay dividends out
of reconstructed net profits of the corporation left to the board of directors, which the
defendant president still dominated).
100. 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927).
101. Id. at 366 (applying South Dakota law in a derivative suit, ordering rescission
of stock sale and return of dividends and providing that the recaptured funds be paid
to the plaintiffs directly).
102. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2nd Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955).
103. Id. at 174.





however, lose the opportunity to build goodwill by strategically
allocating its product during a time of shortage." 7 To the
extent the stock sale premium reflected this diversion of a
corporate opportunity, the selling stockholder was liable for a
breach of fiduciary duty.108 A corporate recovery would not
have benefitted the selling shareholder-i.e., "those from whom
the recovery is had"-but would have benefitted the parties who
had induced the very breach that occasioned the recovery.10 9
The court accordingly ordered direct relief to the minority
shareholders.'
10
Direct recovery cases are rare, however, and those that exist
have been criticized on the grounds that individual recovery
impairs the rights of creditors and other shareholders.1 ' In
Interlake Porsche & Audi, Inc. v. Bucholz, 2 for example, the
court refused to award individual recovery stating that "creditors'
rights would be prejudiced by a direct recovery.
" 113
Even though the derivative plaintiff rarely gains a direct
benefit from a successful derivative claim, the same cannot be
said of the plaintiffs attorney. Since the attorney's actions have
created a fund to the benefit of the corporation, the "common
fund" theory mandates that the attorney's reasonable fees and
expenses be paid from that fund.1 4 The court will thus order
payment where the shareholder prevails in a derivative action
that confers a substantial benefit on the corporation. 115 A
107. Id. at 177.
108. Id. at 177-78.
109. Id. at 178.
110. Id. at 180.
111. See, e.g., Glenn v. Hoteltron Sys., Inc., 547 N.E.2d 71, 74 (N.Y. 1989) (rejecting
any special consideration for close corporations and explaining that, "[w] hile awarding
damages directly to the innocent shareholder may seem equitable with respect to the
parties before the court, other interests, particularly those of the corporation's creditors
should not be overlooked.").
112. 728 P.2d 597 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), petition for review denied, (Wash. Jan. 6,
1987).
113. Id. at 609. The court, however, recognized that the defendant, "as a
shareholder, would profit from his wrongdoing if the corporation recovered the
judgment amount." Id. The court therefore compromised, appointing the plaintiff-
shareholder as trustee for the corporation and its creditors and shareholders. Id.
114. See BJUR & SOLHEIM, supra note 44, § 6045, at 363.
115. Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 365, 101 N.W.2d
423, 426 (1960) (remanding the case to determine whether or not the finding that the
managing officers acted unreasonably resulted in a substantial benefit to the
corporation); In re Dissolution of E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388
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"substantial benefit" means an outcome that "corrects or
prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights and
interests of the corporation or affect the enjoyment or protection
of an essential right to the stockholder's interests." 16 Some-
times the attorney's recovery seems the most remarkable
outcome of the litigation."
7
III. THE DERIVATIVE DISADVANTAGES: BARRIERS TO RECOVERY
A plaintiff in a derivative case faces at least four significant
disadvantages when compared with a plaintiff in a direct case:
the procedural strictures of Rule 23.06, including the demand
requirement; the potentially dispositive report of a special
litigation committee; the protective presumption of the business
judgment rule; and the difficulties, already discussed, of gaining
something from a litigation victory."' In addition, derivative
plaintiffs may face troubles with indemnification obligations and
exculpatory provisions that arguably ought not bedevil direct
plaintiffs.
A. The Procedural Strictures of Rule 23.06
Rule 23.06 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
imposes three procedural requirements on would-be derivative
plaintiffs: (1) the "contemporaneous ownership" requirement;
(2) the "adequate representation" requirement; and (3) the
(1950); Eriksson v. Boyum, 150 Minn. 192, 184 N.W. 961 (1921); Black v. NuAire, Inc.
426 N.W.2d 203, 211-13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding partial attorneys' fees were
properly awarded where derivative action provided impetus for rescission of key
executive's deferred compensation agreement), petition for review denied, (Minn. Aug. 24,
1988).
116. Bosch, 257 Minn. at 366-67, 101 N.W.2d at 427.
117. For example, in 1988, shareholders of First Bank System, Inc., commenced a
derivative suit against the directors and officers of the bank claiming negligence in the
management of the bank's bond portfolio. Two years later the case settled, with the
directors' and officers' liability insurer paying approximately $2.1 million, of which $1.1
million was allocated to attorney's fees and expenses. Neal St. Anthony, Settlement of FBS
Shareholders' Suit OK'd; Legal Fees Cut, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 4, 1990, at ID.
The recovery to the corporation amounted to less than 1.3 cents per outstanding share
of common stock. Form 10-K Yearly Report of First Bank System, Inc., Dec. 31, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, 10-K File (stating that for the fourth quarter of 1990,
First Bank had an average 76,964,065 shares outstanding). The availability of attorney's
fees is one area in which the derivative plaintiff has an advantage over the direct
plaintiff. The latter can recover attorney's fees only in extraordinary situations. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
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demand requirement."' Under the contemporaneous owner-
ship requirement, "the [derivative] complaint shall allege that
the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the
transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiffs
share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by
operation of law." 2' The requirement prevents individuals
from purchasing shares of stock solely for the purpose of
bringing a derivative action.'
The "adequate representation" requirement protects the
interests of shareholders not personally involved in the derivative
litigation. A decision on the merits will be res judicata and will
preclude any further derivative litigation on the same claims.
22
Therefore, " [lt] he derivative action may not be maintained if it
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately repre-
sent the interest of the shareholders ... similarly situated in
enforcing the right of the corporation."123 The fact that a
119. The rule states:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or
members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated
association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a
right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall allege
that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the
transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiff's
share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by
operation of law. The complaint shall also allege with particularity
the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action
from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from
the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiff's
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff
does not fairly and adequately represent the interest of the share-
holders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the
corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or
members in such manner as the court directs.
MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06.
120. Id.
121. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS - RIGHTS, DuTIES AND LIABILITIES, § 9:03, at 9-9 (1995). The contemporane-
ous ownership requirement may also apply to direct actions. See PJ Acquisition Corp.
v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 6 n.12 (Minn. 1990) (suggesting that shareholder in a direct
action must have owned shares at the time of the alleged wrongdoing). At least one
commentator appears to have so assumed. Joseph E. Olson, A Statutory Elixir for the
Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REv. 627 (1985). Indeed, this position seems inevitable
because a direct claimant must assert a direct injury suffered as a shareholder in order
to have a claim.
122. BJUR & SOLHEIM, supra note 44, § 5959, at 124.
123. MINN. R. Cfv. P. 23.06.
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plaintiff owns a minimal number of shares does not necessarily
prevent that shareholder from providing fair and adequate
representation."' However, a shareholder who is pursuing
direct claims may be an inadequate representative in a simulta-
neous derivative suit.
2 5
The demand requirement, the most substantial of Rule
124. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 788 (3rd Cir. 1982) (holding that plaintiff who
owned 100 of the nearly eight million shares in the defendant corporation fairly and
adequately represented the other shareholders), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). In
March v. Miller-Jesser, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), the court held that:
Precluding a single shareholder from pursuing a derivative claim
merely because other shareholders do not seek to enforce the same
rights would frustrate the fundamental purpose of a derivative action,
which is to remedy a wrong to the corporation in cases where the
corporation itself... refuses to take appropriate action for its own
protection.
Id. at 851. See also Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
shareholder owning 23.41% of the stock was an adequate representative), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1012 (1990). See generally Cox ET AL., supra note 13, § 15.11, at 15.99-.101
(discussing minority shareholder plaintiff as an adequate representative); Mary E.
Matthews, Derivative Suits and the Similarly Situated Shareholder Requirement, 8 DEPAUL BUS.
L.J. 1, 36 (1995) (stating that "[i]f Rule 23.1 is interpreted to bar a derivative suit by a
single shareholder, a shareholder objecting to blatant self-dealing or waste by corporate
management would have no relief if similarly situated shareholders simply failed to
exist, or were willing to suffer the corporate injury"). But see Smith v. Ayres, 977 F.2d
946, 948 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that "[o]nly in the rarest instances may there be a
shareholder derivative action with a class of one"), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 910 (1993);
Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., 420 F. Supp. 226, 230-31 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that
a plaintiff who owned 16% of a corporation's outstanding shares did not fairly and
adequately represent the interests of other similarly situated shareholders where the
remaining shareholders contended that plaintiff did not represent their interests).
125. See Smith, 977 F.2d at 949 (stating that a court "should beware allowing a
derivative suit to proceed where the 'representative could conceivably use the derivative
action as "leverage" in other litigation .... '") (quoting Blum v. Morgan Guar. Trust
Co., 539 F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1976)); First Am. Bank & Trust v. Frogel, 726 F.
Supp. 1292, 1298 (S.D. Fl. 1989) (holding that "the conflict in bringing both a
derivative and class action is theoretical rather than real" and that no actual conflict
existed between the derivative action and the class action); Ruggiero v. American
Bioculture, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 93, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that a plaintiff could not
bring both a class action and a derivative action); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin.
Corp., 120 F.R.D. 489, 492 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that "the theoretical distinction
between individual and derivative stockholder suits.... is just that, a theoretical one,
not rooted in the realities of most individual and derivative suits, which usually are
'equally contingent upon the proof of the same nucleus of facts"') (quoting Bertozzi v.
King Louie Int'l., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1180 (D.R.I. 1976)); Schupack v. Covelli, 512
F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that defendants had failed to establish conflict).
The cases finding no conflict tend to involve plaintiffs who have brought both derivative
and class action direct suits. Cf Cox ET AL., supra note 13, § 15.11, at 15.99-.100 (stating
that "smallness of the plaintiff's holdings may well confirm the court's belief that the
plaintiff is seeking to serve a distinct and private agenda through the derivative suit").
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23.06's procedural hurdles, protects the primacy of the board of
directors in managing the corporation. 126 A would-be plaintiff
must try "to obtain the desired action from the directors or
comparable authority" before going to court, or be able to
establish that such efforts would have been futile.1 27  This
requirement affords "the management of the corporation an
opportunity to consider the merits of the dispute and to
determine, in the interests of the corporation and shareholders,
whether it might be disposed of without the expense and delay
of litigation."' 2' That opportunity is meaningless and demand
is excused when the alleged wrongdoers control the board of
directors. 129
The decision whether to make demand is a crucial one for
the derivative plaintiff. If the plaintiff omits demand and a court
126. Cox ET AL., supra note 13, § 15.7, at 15.58.
127. The derivative complaint must "allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made
by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority
and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiff's
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.06.
Under Minnesota law, the standard for establishing demand futility is uncertain. No
case has articulated a specific, all-embracing standard. Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop.
Union, 259 Minn. 257, 107 N.W.2d 226 (1961), comes closest, stating that "[o] rdinarily
a demand should be made on the board of directors unless the wrongdoers constitute
a majority of the board." Id. at 266-67, 107 N.W.2d at 233. In most cases the courts
have seemed to consider the futility to be self-evident, and so the courts have seen no
need to state a general rule. See cases cited infra note 129.
128. Winter, 259 Minn. at 267, 107 N.W.2d at 233.
129. See Savory v. Berkey, 212 Minn. 1, 6, 2 N.W.2d 146, 148 (1942) (holding that
demand would have been futile where defendants owned a majority of stock in the
corporation); Weiland v. Northwestern Distilleries, Inc., 203 Minn. 600, 281 N.W. 364
(1938) (holding that demand was futile in case alleging that the corporation's general
manager/president had through fraud and misrepresentation obtained sufficient stock
to give him majority control); Meyers v. Smith, 190 Minn. 157, 159, 251 N.W. 20, 21
(1933) (holding, in an action brought by a minority shareholder against two directors
to recover misappropriated corporate funds, that "it would be futile to ask or attempt
to have [the two controlling directors] bring an action against themselves, by the
corporation"); Tasler v. Peerless Tire Co., 144 Minn. 150, 153, 174 N.W. 731, 732
(1919) (holding that "[a]n application to [the majority shareholders] to bring suit
against themselves would be futile and such application is not required"); National
Power & Paper Co. v. Rossman, 122 Minn. 355, 142 N.W. 818, 821-22 (1913) (holding
that demand is futile where directors had already moved to dismiss the suit the
intervenor shareholders were seeking to have reinstated). Demand is also excused
where the board has ceased to function. Winter, 259 Minn. at 266-68, 107 N.W.2d at
233-43 (holding that where the corporation, although a legal entity, was nevertheless
a loose nonstock cooperative without salaried officers or employees and for many years
had been inactive and neglected, it would be unrealistic to require the same demand
as would be expected in the case of the ordinary business corporation).
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later determines that demand was required, the plaintiff
loses.13° If plaintiff makes demand, much time can be lost
while the board studies the matter. Moreover, if the board
decides to pursue the claim, the corporation will seek to control
any further proceedings, thereby removing the would-be plaintiff
from any further significant participation."' Only if the board
rejects the demand does the plaintiff obtain, albeit somewhat
belatedly, what it wanted in the first place-i.e., the opportunity
to assert aggressively the interests of the corporation."'
B. The Special Litigation Committee
Regardless of whether the derivative plaintiff initially makes
a demand, these days any derivative suit is likely to encounter a
special litigation committee (SLC) . An SLC is a committee
of the board of directors, consisting only of disinterested
individuals and charged with the authority to investigate the
alleged misconduct and to determine whether the best interests
of the corporation warrant pursuing or eschewing litigation.
13 4
Committee members need not be members of the board,
13 5
130. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 192 (Del. 1988) (dismissing suit for failure
to make demand because plaintiffs failed to plead particular facts sufficient to show
directors were disinterested); Bazata v. National Ins. Co., 400 A.2d 313, 316 (D.C. 1979)
(finding that previous dismissal for failure to make required demand barred subsequent
derivative suit; determination is on the merits and thus res judicata applies).
131. Cox ET AL., supra note 13, § 15.7, at 15.57. A would-be plaintiff might
reasonably wonder how assiduously the board might investigate and how zealously the
board might pursue a remedy. Moreover, plaintiffs counsel might have mercenary
reasons for disliking this outcome. See supra text accompanying notes 114-17 (discussing
how plaintiffs counsel can recover attorney's fees).
132. Under Delaware law the making of a demand almost dooms any subsequent
derivative claim. To make demand is to admit that demand was required. Spiegel v.
Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990) ("By making a demand, a stockholder tacitly
acknowledges the absence of facts to support a finding of futility."). In demand-
required cases, Delaware law gives great deference to the board's determination that the
lawsuit does not serve the corporation's best interest. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981) (holding that in demand-required cases, the business
judgment rule applies to a board decision to seek dismissal). There is no comparable
Minnesota authority and no parallel Minnesota rule.
133. If a would-be plaintiff makes a demand, the corporation may well establish an
SLC at that time. Otherwise, the corporation will establish an SLC once suit is filed.
See App. B.
134. CoX ET AL., supra note 13, § 15.8.
135. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.241, subd. 1 (referring to committees, including
specifically special litigation committees), subd. 2 (stating generally that "[c]ommittee
members shall be natural persons .... who need not be directors"). In discharging
their responsibilities, committee members have the same fiduciary duties and
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and often are not.13
6
An SLC has no power to terminate a derivative suit by itself,
so an SLC's efficacy and impact depends on how much the court
defers to the SLC's determination. That issue, as well as the
status of SLCs generally, has had an eventful history under
Minnesota law.
As originally enacted, the Minnesota Business Corporation
Act contained a provision focussing exclusively on special
litigations committees, authorizing their use and mandating
judicial deference to their determinations. Minnesota Statute
section 302A.243 provided:
Unless prohibited by the articles or bylaws, the board may
establish a committee composed of two or more disinterested
directors or other disinterested persons to determine whether
it is in the best interests of the corporation to pursue a
particular legal right or remedy of the corporation and
whether to cause the dismissal or discontinuance of a
particular proceeding that seeks to assert a right or remedy
on behalf of the corporation. For purposes of this section, a
director or other person is "disinterested" if the director or
other person is not the owner of more than one percent of
the outstanding shares of, or a present or former officer,
employee, or agent of, the corporation or of a related
corporation and has not been made or threatened to be
made a party to the proceeding in question. The committee,
once established, is not subject to the direction or control of,
or termination by, the board. A vacancy on the committee
may be filled by a majority vote of the remaining members.
The good faith determinations of the committee are binding
upon the corporation and its directors, officers, and share-
holders. The committee terminates when it issues a written
report of its determination to the board. 7
In 1988, the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied section
protections as directors. Id. at subd. 7 (deeming committee members to be directors
for the purposes of the statutes relating to director standard of conduct, director
conflicts of interest and indemnification).
136. See, e.g., Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(explaining that the committee member selected had no "prior relationship with [the
corporation], its directors, or [the plaintiff-shareholder]"), petition for review denied,
(Minn. Feb. 27, 1996); Alford v. Shaw, 349 S.E.2d 41, 54 (N.C. 1986) (stating that
defendant corporation had asked the President of the North Carolina Bar Association
to recommend two persons "'who [had] never been associated in any way with the
Company or any of its affiliates' to serve as [committee] members.").
137. 1982 Minn. Laws ch. 497, § 28.
1996]
1WLLIAM MITC-HLL LAW REVIEW
302A.243 in Black v. NuAire, Inc.,"3 a derivative action brought
by a minority shareholder of a close corporation. 1' The suit
challenged a number of transactions undertaken by the majority
shareholders,"14 and the corporation established an SLC to
review these actions.141 The committee found that "only one
charge ... appears to hold out the prospect of significant
benefit to the corporation if its damage allegation are borne
out."142  The committee recommended that the suit be
dismissed if the arrangement giving rise to that charge was
rescinded. 43
The trial court accepted the SLC's recommendation and
dismissed the suit. 44  The plaintiff-shareholder appealed,
challenging the trial court's refusal to review the propriety of the
committee's decision and claiming inter alia that the trial court's
application of section 302A.243 deprived him of property
without due process of law. 45 The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision, finding that the shareholder's constitu-
tional arguments were without merit."4  Then the court ap-
plied section 302A.243 and held that, where an SLC is truly
disinterested and has conducted its investigation in good faith,
its recommendation to dismiss a shareholder derivative suit is not




The next year, in reaction to NuAire, the Minnesota
138. 426 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), petition for review denied, (Minn. Aug.
24, 1988).
139. Id. at 209.
140. Id. at 206.
141. Id.
142. Id. The committee believed that a deferred compensation agreement with one
of NuAire's directors had a "definite damage potential." Id.
143. Id. at 207.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 208-09.
146. Id. at 209-10.
147. Id. The court of appeals expressly declined to apply the rule adopted by the
Iowa Supreme Court in Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709
(Iowa 1983). NuAire, 426 N.W.2d at 210 n.3. In Miller, the court virtually presumed
structural bias on the part of any SLC appointed by directors who are parties to the
derivative action. Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 718. The Miller "court therefore adopted a
prophylactic rule prohibiting directors charged with misconduct from participating in
the selection process. When a majority of directors are parties to the action, the
corporation is required to apply to the court for appointment of a 'special panel' to
investigate" the derivative claims and to recommend whether the shareholder derivative
action should be pursued or dismissed. NuAire, 426 N.W.2d at 210 n.3 (construing
Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 718).
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Legislature repealed section 302A.243. However, in a manner
reminiscent of Ron Ziegler's non-denial denials,"4 the legisla-
ture sought to undercut the meaning of its action.149 The
repeal legislation included the following language:
[T]he repeal of Minnesota Statutes, section 302A.243, does
not imply that the legislature has accepted or rejected the
substance of the repealed section but must be interpreted in
the same manner as if section 302A.243 had not been enact-
ed.
150
In addition, the legislature simultaneously amended Minnesota
Statutes section 302A.241, relating generally to board commit-
tees, to expressly authorize special litigation committees.1"1 As
then amended (and as now in effect), that provision reads in
pertinent part:
A resolution approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of
the board may establish committees having the authority of
the board in the management of the business of the corpora-
tion only to the extent provided in the resolution. Committees
may include a special litigation committee consisting of one or more
independent directors or other independent persons to consider legal
rights or remedies of the corporation and whether those rights and
remedies should be pursued.'52
Until 1995, it was unclear how the legislature's 1989 action
had affected SLCs in general and the NuAire holding in particu-
lar. In 1995, in Skoglund v. Brady, the court of appeals clarified
matters.
1 53
Skoglund involved a derivative action against the corporation
and its board of directors. 54 The plaintiff-shareholder object-
ed to building and equipment leases authorized by the board,
promissory notes issued and bonuses paid to two directors, and
the issuance and sale of additional stock in exchange for
148. Ron Ziegler was White House press secretary during the Watergate scandal.
As the cover-up began to unravel, Ziegler tried to repel the increasing barrage of
allegations by issuing vehement denials that, upon further scrutiny, revealed themselves
as not precisely denying the key parts of the allegations. CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB
WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 162-69, 185 (Touchstone 2d ed. 1994) (1974).
149. See 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 172, § 12.
150. Id.
151. Id. § 5.
152. MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subd. 1 (1994) (emphasis added).
153. Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), petition for review
denied, (Minn. Feb. 27, 1996).
154. Id. at 19.
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forgiveness of debt owed to one director.155 The suit alleged
breach of fiduciary duties, usurped corporate opportunities,
waste and fraud.
156
The corporation's board of directors appointed a special
litigation committee consisting of one attorney who had no
prior relationship with the corporation or its directors. 57 The
committee concluded that, although the board had not obtained
"safe harbor" authorization for the leases, promissory notes, or
forgiveness of debt, the corporation was not damaged by these
actions. 158 The committee did find corporate waste in the
issuance of additional shares at one-half the stock's value.
159
The committee, however, recommended against pursuing the
corporate waste claim in light of the expenses associated with the
litigation." °  Nonetheless, the involved director offered to
rescind the stock purchase and the corporation accepted the
offer. 161
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs derivative suit,
holding that the special litigation committee was independent
and had conducted its investigation in good faith.1 62  On
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the repeal of section 302A.243
had changed the judiciary's role vis-A-vis SLCs. The plaintiff
asserted that the court should more strictly scrutinize the
155. Id.
156. Id. The suit initially contained direct claims as well. The corporation's board
of directors appointed an SLC consisting of the lead author of this article to examine
the derivative claims. Because the direct and derivative claims overlapped and because
disposing of the derivative claims would have been fruitless if the direct claims had
remained in place, the committee declined to proceed. It recommended instead that
the corporation ask the trial court promptly to determine whether the plaintiff had a
right to bring direct claims or rather was limited to a derivative suit. The corporation
followed that recommendation, and the trial court dismissed the direct claims. Id. The
court of appeals affirmed that dismissal. Id. at 22. See infra notes 163-64. Following the
trial court's dismissal of the direct claims, the corporation appointed a new SLC to
investigate the derivative claims.




161. Memorandum of Nominal Defendant, Instrumentation Services, Inc. in Support
of Motion to Dismiss Derivative Claims at 3, Skoglund v. Brady, No. 92-011833
(Hennepin County Dist. Ct. April 7, 1995).
162. Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 19. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's direct
claims on the grounds that "[the plaintiff] did not allege injury to himself that was




independence of the SLC and should conduct a substantive
review of the SLC's decision."6 The court of appeals rejected
these arguments, holding instead that the district court had
properly limited its review to determining whether the SLC was
independent and had conducted its review in good faith."6 In
essence, Skoglund reaffirmed NuAire.
That is a good result, since special litigation committees are
a form of alternative dispute resolution. They sift facts and make
recommendations in the shadow or context of litigation proceed-
ings," s but they do not directly consume court resources and
are not laden with all the procedural paraphernalia of litigation.
From the corporation's perspective, they represent an opportuni-
ty to have a business dispute evaluated by one or more disinter-
ested individuals with relevant background and expertise, who
will have in mind not only abstract concepts of fairness but also
the rough and tumble exigencies of running a business.
Moreover, as recognized by the court of appeals, an SLC helps
a corporation deal with disgruntled individual plaintiffs who seek
to make personal gain out of a corporate concern: "The
purpose ... is to grant corporations the ability to respond
effectively to potential abuses of strike suits, in which a single
dissenting shareholder, owning only one share of stock, may file
a derivative suit for its nuisance value alone."
166
From the plaintiff's perspective, in contrast, special litigation
committees are an anathema, hand-picked by the board and
possessed of at least structural bias.'67 SLCs do most often
163. Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 21.
164. Id.
165. They operate in the shadow of such proceedings when investigating a pre-suit
demand. They operate in the context of such proceedings when they investigate
following the filing of suit. See supra text accompanying note 134 and infra App. B.
166. Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), petition for
reiew denied, (Minn. Aug. 24, 1988).
167. Consider, for example, the vitriolic response of counsel for the plaintiff in
Skogiund when informed that the corporation had appointed an SLC. That attorney not
only refused to cooperate in any respect with the committee but also threatened to sue
the committee's sole member. Letter from James H. Kaster to Daniel S. Kleinberger
(June 10, 1993) (stating that "if you are intent on acting to interrupt this litigation, I
may pursue litigation based on the personal liability you have assumed"). The SLC
eventually declined to evaluate the derivative claims pending a court determination as
to whether the plaintiff had standing to bring direct claims. See supra note 156. The
court ruled that the plaintiff had no such standing, and the corporation then appointed
a new special litigation committee, with a different member. That SLC eventually
recommended dismissal, the trial court accepted the recommendation and the court
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recommend against proceeding with a lawsuit,1" but such
recommendations are sometimes coupled with some recovery for
the corporation. In Skoglund, for example, the SLC objected to
the stock purchase, and the defendant director voluntarily
rescinded the purchase. 69  In NuAire, the SLC recommended
dismissal only if the parties reversed the one arrangement even
arguably objectionable.'
70
In any event, the special litigation committee constitutes a
significant barrier to a derivative suit that is totally absent in a
suit properly alleging direct claims.
of appeals affirmed. See supra text accompanying notes 157-64.
For a less assaultive but still impassioned opposition to SLCs, see Joseph W.
Anthony & Karlyn Vegoe Boraas, Minority Shareholder Rights-Revisited, HENNEPIN LAW.,
Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 20, 22-23. For a critique of the Anthony-Boraas view, see Daniel S.
Kleinberger, HENNEPIN LAw., May-June 1996, at 25 (Professor Kleinberger's letter to the
editor). See also Joseph W. Anthony, Betrayed, Belittled... But Triumphant: Claims of
Shareholders in Closely Held Business, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1173, 1195-1197 (1996)
(accompanying article in this symposium issue).
The Iowa Supreme Court shares at least some of this skepticism to SLCs. In Miller
v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983), the court saw a dan-
ger of
structural bias on the part of a litigation committee appointed by
directors who are parties to derivative actions. The court therefore
adopted a prophylactic rule prohibiting directors charged with
misconduct from participating in the selection process. When a
majority of directors are parties to the action, the corporation is
required to apply to the court for appointment of a "special panel"
to investigate and report on the pursuit or dismissal of a shareholder
derivative action.
NuAire, 426 N.W.2d at 210 n.3 (quoting Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 718). For a while, even
the Delaware courts flirted with this skepticism. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981) (holding that, when demand is excused as futile, the court
must not only require the SLC to establish good faith and reasonable investigation but
may also exercise its own business judgment as to the wisdom of the SLC's recommen-
dation). But see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d
180 (Del. 1988) (making demand futility extremely difficult to establish and thereby
substantially undercutting the impact of the Zapata rule); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d
1184, 1192 (Del. 1985) (holding that the trial court has the discretion to decline to
judge the wisdom of the SLC's recommendation).
168. See Robert P. Mulvey, Note, Special Litigation Committees- An Expanding and Potent
Threat to Shareholder Derivative Suits, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 169, 170 (1980).
169. See supra text accompanying note 161.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
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C. The Business Judgment Rule
A cornerstone of corporation law,
[t]he "business judgment" rule is an impediment to any
plaintiff who attacks the performance of business manag-
ers .... In its strongest form, the rule requires courts to
defer almost completely to managers' exercise of business
judgment, and it immunizes managers from liability unless
the complainant can show dishonesty, disloyalty, a total failure
to exercise judgment, or judgment so bad that it amounts to
waste. The strong version of the business judgment rule
virtually eliminates any enforceable duty of care. Moreover,
the rule presumes that the managers have acted properly. In
its milder version, the business judgement rule includes the
presumption but adds something of a duty of care.
171
Minnesota certainly honors the business judgment rule,
although the state has a somewhat schizoid approach to the
rule's power over duty of care claims. A 1948 Minnesota
Supreme Court opinion stated the rule in its most aggressive
form:
In a derivative suit, absent clear allegations of facts constitut-
ing fraud or collusion, plaintiff must allege facts which show
that the action attacked is so far opposed to the true interests
of the corporation as to lead to the clear inference that no
officer thus actini could have been influenced by any honest
desire to secure such interests, but that he must have acted
with intent to subserve some ulterior purpose, regardless of
the consequences to his corporation and in a manner
inconsistent with its interest .... The law does not justify
recovery in representative suits for mere errors of judgment
in handling corporate affairs.'72
A 1917 opinion, in contrast, reflects the milder approach:
The directors of a corporation occupy a fiduciary relation to
it which imposes upon them the duty to... exercise ordinary
business care and diligence to see that its property is not
wasted nor taken from it upon unfounded claims .... [If
171. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 1, 10.05[1], at 10-41. The rule has a
sensible rationale, recognizing "that business decision-making is not an exact science
and that a regime of strict liability would chill innovation, deter risk-taking and
discourage competent individuals from serving." Id. Moreover, the rule's "presumption
in favor of managers merely reflects the law's general requirement that plaintiffs prove
the elements of their case." Id.
172. Warner v. E. C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565, 573, 33 N.W.2d 721, 726 (1948).
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they breach this duty] they are liable to the corporation for
any losses resulting from such misuse of authority or neglect
of duty.
1 73
The corporate statute also reflects the milder approach, requir-
ing each director to "discharge the duties of the position of
director... with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances. "74
In any event, whichever version of the business judgment
rule exists in Minnesota, the rule clearly applies in derivative
litigation and constitutes a serious obstacle to any derivative
plaintiff.175  In contrast, the business judgment rule plays no
role with direct claims made within a Minnesota close corpora-
tion. Minnesota's leading close corporation cases have featured
egregious conduct and overwhelming evidence, and the deci-
sions exhibit none of the deference to management that
characterizes business judgment cases.1 76  Moreover, the Min-
173. Lake Harriet State Bank v. Venie, 138 Minn. 339, 346-47, 165 N.W. 225, 228-29
(1917), quoted in Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352, 357 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986), petition for review denied, (Minn. Sept. 22, 1986); see also Horn Silver Mining
Co. v. Ryan, 42 Minn. 196, 44 N.W. 56 (1889). In Horn, a shareholder brought a
derivative suit alleging that a director had breached his duty of care by negligently
failing to prevent other officers from taking corporate funds. Id. at 198-200, 44 N.W.
at 57. The court held that the defendant
ought to have known the truth in respect to the fraud and miscon-
duct charged, and to have taken steps to prevent and expose the
same, which he wholly failed to do so, but abstained from attending
the meetings, and neglected to perform his duties to the corporation
and its stockholders in the protection of the rights and property of
the corporation; and that, by reason of his non-feasance and neglect,
the plaintiff has been damaged as claimed.
Id. at 200, 44 N.W. at 57. The result is sensible, but the duty of care standard is at best
muddy. The court first articulated a gross negligence standard, stating that directors
are "liable if they suffer the corporate funds or property to be lost or wasted by gross
negligence and inattention to the duties of their trust." Id. at 198-99, 44 N.W. at 56
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). Immediately afterwards, the court states a reason-
able care standard: "The measure of care and diligence required of directors is
generally held to be such as a prudent man exercises in his own affairs." Id. at 199, 44
N.W. at 56.
174. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 1. Subdivision 2, dealingwithjustifiable reliance
on information provided by others, also reflects a reasonable care standard. Id. at subd.
2(a) (1)-(3).
175. Warner, 226 Minn. at 573, 33 N.W.2d at 726. Of course, a plaintiff can
overcome the presumptions of the rule and obtain a remedy. See BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, supra note 1, 10.05[1], at 10-41.
176. See, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duties by firing minority shareholder,
their brother, after he inquired into financial discrepancies in the corporation's
financial records), petition for review denied, (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992); Evans v. Blesi, 345
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nesota Court of Appeals has suggested that Minnesota follows the
Wilkes test, articulated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.177 Under Wilkes,
if the plaintiff raises a plausible claim of oppression, the
defendants have the burden of proving a legitimate business
purpose. 7 If the defendants meet that burden, the plaintiff
can still prevail by showing "that the same legitimate objective
could have been achieved through an alternative course of
action less harmful to the minority's interest."
179
The Wilkes standard is dramatically better for plaintiffs than
the businessjudgment rule. Wilkes' "legitimate business purpose"
prong reverses the normal presumption of good faith and
requires the defendants to prove their bona fides. The "less
harmful alternative" prong subjects corporate management to
judicial second guessing reminiscent of the scrutiny applied
when courts review statutes that infringe fundamental interests
or use suspect classifications.180
D. Indemnification
When a disgruntled shareholder brings suit, the individual
defendants have an obvious advantage if they can cause the
corporation to advance attorneys' fees and other costs of
N.W.2d 775, 780 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding the majority shareholder breached his
fiduciary duties by using intimidating tactics to obtain majority control and plaintiff's
resignation), petition for review denied, (Minn. June 12, 1984). Even if the business
judgment rule applied to such cases, the evidence of misconduct would suffice to rebut
the rule's presumptions. See supra note 170.
177. 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976), cited with approval in Harris v. Mardan
Business Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that "(elven
if [defendant majority shareholder] owed some lesser duty by virtue of [plaintiff's] stock
ownership, [defendant] did not breach that duty because he has been able to
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for his action"), petition for review denied,
(Minn. May 18, 1988).
178. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
179. Id. This two-part test, with its shifting burdens, resembles the test used in Title
VII cases. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Wikes
makes no reference, however, to that line of authority.
180. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3(a), at
601-02 (5th ed. 1995) (explaining that strict scrutiny review requires the state to show
not only that it is pursuing a compelling state interest, but also that state action is
narrowly tailored to promote that compelling state interest). Wilkes did recognize that,
even within a close corporation, management must have some leeway and that
controlling shareholders have certain legitimate rights of "selfish ownership." Wdkes,
353 N.E.2d at 663. Nonetheless, the Wilkes rule is a far cry from the ordinary business
judgment rule.
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litigation. The defendants have an even greater advantage if the
corporation will ultimately have to indemnify the defendants
against any judgment or penalty. There is at least some
argument that a derivative defendant has clearer access to
defense costs and indemnity than does a direct defendant.
A defendant's right to indemnification and advances rests
on Minnesota Statutes section 302A.521. Under specified
conditions a corporate director or officer has the right to both
advances and indemnification, unless the corporation's articles
or bylaws provide otherwise. 181 However, neither are available
to a defendant who, "with respect to the acts or
omissions.., complained of,"182 has failed to "act[] in good
faith"'83 or has received an "improper personal benefit."'84
Allegations of bad faith or improper personal benefit are
hallmarks of both direct and derivative litigation,'85 but at least
pending the final outcome of either type of proceeding determi-
nations of eligibility are likely to be made by persons at least
initially sympathetic to the defendants.8 6 Still, there seems
181. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.521, subd. 2 (purporting to mandate indemnification),
subd. 3 (purporting to mandate advances), subd. 4 (permitting articles and bylaws to
prohibit indemnification and advances, to set limits on them and to impose additional
conditions). The purpose of indemnification is to encourage capable and responsible
individuals to accept corporate management positions. Tomash v. Midwest Technical
Dev. Corp., 281 Minn. 21, 28, 160 N.W.2d 273, 278 (1968) (denying defendants
indemnity where defendants were not completely vindicated of all misconduct in action
brought against them by the SEC); In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 213-14, 45
N.W.2d 388, 393 (1950) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing attorneys' fees in
sum of $15,000 in a derivative suit against the director of corporation, where the legal
services were necessary to vindicate defendant director).
182. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subd. 2(a).
183. Id. at subd. 2(a) (2).
184. Id. atsubd. 2(a)(3).
185. See, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (plaintiff
in a direct suit for breach of fiduciary duty testified that when he inquired about
financial discrepancies in the corporate records, "he was told to cooperate, resign or be
fired."), petition for review denied, (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775,
777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (plaintiff minority shareholder in a direct suit alleged that
"he had acted under fraud and duress when he transferred the stock [to the defendant]
and resigned"), petition for review denied, (Minn. June 12, 1984); Miller v. Miller, 301
Minn. 207, 208, 222 N.W.2d 71, 73 (1974) (derivative action asserting defendants
"wrongfully diverted corporate opportunities properly belonging to [the corporation]");
Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union, 259 Minn. 257, 107 N.W.2d 226, 226 (1961)
(derivative action brought "to recover for the corporation [funds] ... wrongfully
appropriated [by the corporation's president] for his own use").
186. Minnesota Statutes § 302A.521, subdivision 6 contains a detailed scheme for
deciding who makes the eligibility determination. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subd. 6
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some argument to be made that allowing the corporation to
indemnify the alleged oppressor in a direct claim is merely to
perpetuate a key aspect of the oppression-namely, the control-
ling shareholder's use of corporate assets to benefit that
shareholder's interest to the unfair prejudice of the minority
shareholder."8 7
E. Exculpatory Provisions
Enacted in 1987, Minnesota Statutes section 302A.251,
subdivision 4 permits a corporation to prospectively eliminate
"[a] director's personal liability to the corporation or its
shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty
as a director.""s An exculpatory provision may not, however,
eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (a) for any breach
of director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its share-
holders; (b) for acts or omissions not in good faith or that
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law;... and (d) for any transaction from which the director
(1994). In the first instance the board will decide, if it can muster a quorum and
majority of directors uninvolved in the underlying proceeding. Id. at subd. 6(a) (1).
If it cannot, any two or more disinterested directors may make the determination. Id.
at subd. 6(a) (2). If all, or all but one, of the directors are involved, the board may
select a special counsel to make the determination. Id. at subd. 6(a) (3). The involved
directors can participate in that selection. Id. Under each of these scenarios, the
decision is made either by colleagues of the director/defendants or by someone hand-
picked by a board of directors, at least a majority of whose members are
director/defendants. The determination can also be left to a vote of the shareholders
other than those who are parties to the underlying litigation. Id. at subd. 6(a) (4).
187. But cf. Barry v. Barry, 28 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Minnesota law).
In Bary, the plaintiff, a former shareholder, alleged that the defendants had
fraudulently induced her to sell her stock to the corporation by providing false financial
information and by concealing favorable financial information. Id. at 850. The
defendants had been shareholders and corporate officers at the time of the alleged
fraud but had since sold their interest in the corporation. Id. at 849-50. The
defendants sought indemnification and advances for legal expenses. Id. The
corporation's board of directors denied the request, contending that the plaintiff was
suing the defendants for actions taken in their capacity as shareholders rather than in
their "status as corporate directors or officers." Id. at 851. The court disagreed, noting
that "the mere fact that the [defendants] wore two hats in their dealings with [the
corporation] and with [the plaintiff] does not compel the conclusion that they were not
sued at least in part, because of their official status." Id. (quoting Barry v. Barry, 824
F. Supp. 178, 185 (D. Minn. 1993)). Barry does not consider the argument offered in
the text.
188. The exculpatory provision must appear in the articles of incorporation. MINN.
STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 4.
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derived an improper personal benefit." 9
As a result, exculpatory provisions will be largely irrelevant
to claims of misconduct within a close corporation. Most such
claims, whether direct or derivative, assert bad faith, improper
personal benefit, breach of the duty of loyalty, or some combina-
tion."' ° Exculpation is, however, relevant to claims of waste
and mismanagement, so it is worthwhile to determine whether
exculpatory provisions impede the derivative plaintiff more than
the direct. Section 302A.251, subdivision 4 evidently applies to
derivative claims. The question is whether the subdivision
applies to direct claims as well.
The statutory language suggests the answer is yes; subdivi-
sion 4(a) expressly refers to a "director's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its shareholders."191 The legislative history points
in the same direction. Subdivision 4 was copied essentially
verbatim from the comparable Delaware statute, 112 which in
turn had been enacted in response to Smith v. Van Gorkom.'93
In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held directors liable
for having failed, through gross negligence, to obtain a fair price
for the corporation in a merger transaction. The suit was a
direct class action on behalf of the shareholders. 94 Against
this background, it would make no sense to exclude direct
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 29 (direct), and 56 (derivative).
191. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 4(a) (emphasis added).
192. The Delaware statute provides in relevant part:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the
certificate of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the
certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the
following matters:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of
a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such
provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i)
For any beach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or
its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii)
under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 1 § 102 (Supp. 1994)
193. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER,
supra note 1, 10.06[2][b], at 10-45.
194. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 863. Subsequent Delaware decisions have reiterated
that directors owe a direct duty to shareholders when the corporation is up for sale.




actions from the purview of subdivision 4.
There are, however, at least two reasons for making an
exclusion for any direct actions brought within a closely held
corporation. The first reason appears from a close reading of
the statutory language. Subdivision 4 allows elimination or
limitation of "[a] director's personal liability ... for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director."195 In a close corporation, share-
holders owe each other fiduciary duties qua shareholders.
9 6
Even if a controlling shareholder is also a director, any oppres-
sion actionable as a direct claim will almost certainly involve a
breach of that shareholder's duty as a shareholder and will
therefore be outside the purview of any exculpatory provision.
The second reason emerges from reading subdivision 4 in
pari materia with Minnesota Statutes section 302A.751. The latter
statute makes doubtful the power of any agreement, exculpatory
or otherwise, to irrevocably affect relationships among sharehold-
ers in a close corporation. Section 302A.751, subdivision 3a
provides that, in determining a shareholder's enforceable
expectations, even written agreements personally signed by all
the shareholders are merely "presumed to reflect the parties'
reasonable expectations. "197 In addition, expectations that
have evolved are likely to trump earlier-executed documents.19
More particularly, section 302A.751, subdivision 2 provides that
courts will respect an agreed upon buy-sell price "unless the
court determines that the price or terms are unreasonable under
all the circumstances of the case."1 These provisions suggest
that Minnesota policy disfavors documents as planning devices
195. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 4 (emphasis added).
196. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3a (referring to "the duty which all
shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair,
and reasonable manner"). See generally supra Part II (describing the statutory and
common law sources for direct claims in a close corporation).
197. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3(a) (emphasis added).
198. Id. (making enforceable shareholders' reasonable expectations "as they exist
at the inception and develop during the course of the shareholders' relationship with
the corporation and with each other"). See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 1,
10.09 [4] [a] (discussing "statutes that undermine agreements").
199. The court of appeals has accepted this invitation. See Pedro v. Pedro, 489
N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (declining to apply the buy-out price stated in
a stock redemption agreement and holding, where a minority shareholder had proven
an unlawful freeze-out, that the damages included the difference between the stock
redemption price and the fair value of the stock), petition for review denied, (Minn. Oct.
20, 1992).
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in close corporations. 2' A fortiori the policy cuts against using
documents to exculpate a close corporation's controlling
shareholders.
Thus, when section 302A.251, subdivision 4 is read closely
and in para materia, it appears to exclude from exculpation all
direct claims within a close corporation. If so, subdivision 4joins
the list of obstacles faced by a derivative plaintiff but not the
direct.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF A THRESHOLD DETERMINATION
It is thus quite important to distinguish between direct and
derivative claims in the context of a close corporation. 20 1 As
to any particular lawsuit, it is equally important to draw the
distinction early. Delay can cause the parties, the attorneys and
even the court to waste time, effort and resources. Suppose, for
example, that (i) a plaintiff files suit asserting direct claims, (ii)
the corporation moves to dismiss asserting that, accepting the
complaint's allegations are true, the claims are derivative, (iii)
the claims are indeed derivative and are destined to be dis-
missed, but (iv) the court prefers to reserve its decision pending
discovery.202 As a result, discovery will have to include and
perhaps even focus on matters largely, if not completely,
immaterial to a derivative claim. For instance, the parties will
have to explore the plaintiff's expectations, the reasonableness
of those expectations, the relationship of those expectations to
the expectations of the other shareholders, the reasonableness
of those other shareholders' expectations, etc.20 3  Moreover,
efficient trial preparation presupposes that the attorneys have or
200. See Kleinberger, supra note 9, at 1155-56 (discussing how Minnesota law may
"destroy one of the most important expectations a business person can
have-predictability in the rules of the game"); BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 1,
10.09[4] [a] (discussing "statutes that undermine agreements").
201. See infra App. B for a chart summarizing the differences between a direct and
derivative suit in the context of a close corporation.
202. Except in extraordinary circumstances, it should be possible to make the
direct/derivative determination without discovery. See infra part VIIA
203. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3a. Section 302A.751, subdivision 3a
provides that "[iln determining whether to order equitable relief, dissolution, or a buy-
out, the court shall take into consideration ... [inter alia] the reasonable expectations
of all shareholders...." Id. A 1994 Amendment substituted "all shareholders" for "the
shareholders," indicating that courts must consider the interrelationship of shareholder
expectations. 1994 Minn. Laws ch. 417, § 11. For a discussion of the interrelationship,
see Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983).
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204develop a theory of the case. To do so they must know,
sooner rather than later, whether the case is direct or derivative.
Delay poses additional problems when a plaintiff brings both
direct and derivative claims." 5 The problems relate to the
functioning of a special litigation committee, which a prudent
corporation may wish to establish to review the derivative
claims." 6 Assuming the derivative and direct claims have a
common factual basis, the best interests of the corporation will
ordinarily preclude the SLC from making any investigation until
the court resolves the direct/derivative issue.
This conclusion has nothing to do with the merits of the
plaintiff's claims but rather reflects the fact that an SLC has no
power to affect direct claims. The conclusion can be best
explained by assuming, first, that: (i) the SLC proceeds with an
investigation; (ii) the SLC concludes that the best interests of the
corporation require dismissal of the derivative claims; (iii) the
corporation presents the report of the SLC to the court and
seeks dismissal of the derivative claims; and (iv) the court
dismisses the derivative claims.
Even in those circumstances the corporation would not
substantially benefit because the litigation would continue on the
direct claims. Because the direct claims rest on the same factual
allegations as the derivative claims, the same facts would remain
in issue. Moreover, the corporation's key executives would
remain embroiled in the litigation, and these individuals would
continue to be distracted from their entrepreneurial and
management activities. In addition, the corporation would
remain at financial risk. If the plaintiff were to prevail, the
204. 1 ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSTENG, PLANNING TO WIN: EFFECIVE
PREPARATION 37-40 (1994).
205. This was the situation in the case which led to the Skoglund decision, one of
Minnesota's most recent decisions dealing with the direct/derivative issue. Skoglund
v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), petitionfor review denied, (Minn. Feb. 27,
1996). In that case the corporation appointed a special litigation committee to evaluate
the derivative claim; the lead author of this article was the sole member of the
committee. For the reasons stated in the text, the committee declined to conduct any
investigation of the derivative claim and recommended instead that the corporation ask
the court to determine whether the plaintiff could proceed with the direct suit. Id. at
19. The corporation followed that recommendation, and the trial court subsequently
dismissed the direct claims. Id. The corporation then appointed another special
litigation committee, with a different member, to investigate the derivative claim. The
court of appeals later affirmed the dismissal of the direct claims. Id. at 22.
206. For a discussion of special litigation committees, see supra part III.B.
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corporation would face possible dissolution or a mandatory buy
out of the plaintiffs stock. °7 If the individual defendants were
to prevail, the corporation might well be obliged to indemnify
them.
208
Comparable complications appear assuming that the special
litigation committee proceeds with an investigation and con-
cludes that the best interests of the corporation require pressing
the corporation's claims. The existence of overlapping direct
claims would complicate matters significantly. Since remedies
for derivative claims ordinarily inure to the corporation and
remedies for direct claims inure to the plaintiff personally,
209
the corporation's best interests might well conflict with the plain-
tiff's. The plaintiff personally might have a conflict of interest,
given his dual roles as direct and derivative plaintiff.
2 10
In sum, so long as both direct and derivative claims remain in
the lawsuit an investigation by the SLC will provide no substan-
tial benefit to the corporation.
V. MAKING THE DISTINCTION:
MINNESOTA'S CURRENT APPROACH
To understand how Minnesota law differentiates between
direct and derivative claims within a close corporation, it is
necessary to understand how Minnesota approaches that
question generally. At present, the general approach is all that
is available;211 there is no special rule for close corporations.
Indeed, there is little, if any, recognition that special treatment
might be appropriate. 12
There are at least two reasons for this situation. First, in the
207. MINN. SrAT. §§ 302A.751, subd. 1 (providing generally for equitable relief),
subd. 2 (authorizing the court to require the corporation to purchase the plaintiff
shareholder's stock).
208. See supra part III.D. (discussing indemnification).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 47, 92-95 (discussing who benefits from
recoveries in direct and derivative cases).
210. See supra notes 122-25 (discussing "fair and adequate representation"
requirement).
211. See infra part VI (discussing if a special rule is appropriate). For the sake of
conceptual consonance, the special rule should at least rest on the generally applicable
rule.
212. The situation is different is some otherjurisdictions. Moreover, the American
Law Institute has proposed a special rule. See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01(d) (1992) (Am. Law Inst.) (hereinafter
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. See infra text accompanying note 315.
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archetypical close corporation case the direct/derivative issue
does not arise; the plaintiff alleges termination of employment
and a freeze-out, thereby presenting an obviously direct
claim.21 Second, when the direct/derivative issue has come
up in close corporation cases, Minnesota courts have decided the
issue either on a conclusory basis or without considering the
corporation's closely held character.
For example, in PJAcquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, the Minneso-
ta Supreme Court addressed the direct/derivative issue but made
nothing of the corporation's closely held status." 4 The court
simply reaffirmed the trial court's conclusory findings that
because the "allegations ... fail to allege any direct injury to
[plaintiff], as shareholders, but rather only to [the corporation],
and because [plaintiff] seeks relief in favor of [the corporation]
rather than itself... the action in reality was a shareholder's
derivative action."
215
The court of appeals has provided no greater guidance. In
Wenzel v. Mathies,216 for example, the court concluded without
analysis that defendant's "actions in the context of a closely-held,
single-bank holding company, provide a basis for a direct
213. See, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (majority
shareholders fired minority shareholder and discontinued his pay and benefits when he
inquired into the financial discrepancies in the corporation's records), petition for review
denied, (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (after forcing the plaintiff minority shareholder to surrender majority control, the
defendant majority shareholder demanded the plaintiff resign from his employment),
petition for review denied, (Minn. June 12, 1984); Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Nos. C7-90-2040,
C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991) (defendant
shareholders terminated the employment of the plaintiff who had an expectation of
continued employment), petition for review denied, (Minn. Apr. 18, 1991).
214. PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Minn. 1990) (describing
the parties and the case's procedural posture without mentioning close corporation
status); id. at 14 n.1 (criticizing the majority for relying on a case that "did not involve
a closely held corporation") (Yetka, J., dissenting). The case involved a dispute among
owners of the corporation that owned the Minnesota Vikings. Id. at 2. The plaintiffs
accused the defendant corporate officers and directors of having breached their
fiduciary duties and of having abused corporate control by paying excessive salaries,
using corporate assets for non-corporate purposes, and usurping a corporate opportuni-
ty. Id. at 3.
215. Id. at 4. See also Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn. 1982) (holding
that an alleged claim for breach of fiduciary duty stated a derivative rather than direct
claim "because a tight of action for diversion of corporate funds is in the corporation,
not the individual" and making no reference to the corporation's closely held nature).
216. 542 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), petition for review denied, (Minn. Mar.
28, 1996).
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action. "217 As the only clue to its reasoning, the panel cited
Steelman v. Mallory, an Idaho decision holding that a direct action
is permissible when "[t] he gravamen of [plaintiff s] complaint is
that the majority shareholders/directors were attempting to
squeeze him out. 21  Wenzel, however, held that minority
shareholders in operational control of a corporation owed
fiduciary duties to the pledgees of a majority block of shares and
thus hardly involved a classic squeeze-out.
219
The analysis in Skoglund v. Brady 2° was likewise cursory,
although to the opposite effect. Without explanation or detail
the court concluded that "[plaintiff-shareholder] does not allege
an injury to himself that is separate and distinct from any injury
to the corporation."2 1 In Hein v. Schaffer,2 the court was
even more laconic, asserting baldly that the "claim brought for
[defendant's] alleged breach of a fiduciary duty ... is a deriva-
tive action."221 Wheeler v. McGeW24 provided a little more in-
formation, recognizing that "shareholders in a closely held
corporation owe one another a fiduciary duty that requires them
to deal openly, honestly, and fairly with each other"225 and
concluding that "[b] reach of that duty is a personal claim and
217. Id. at 641.
218. Wenze 542 N.W.2d at 641 (quoting Steelman v. Mallory, 716 P.2d 1282, 1285
(Idaho 1986)).
219. Wenzel 542 N.W.2d at 640. According to the court, the controlling insiders
breached those duties when they caused the corporation to issue new stock to
themselves and their associates. Id. at 640-41. The issuance of the new shares cost the
majority block its majority status, which prejudiced the pledgees' interest. Id. at 641.
A classic freeze out involves the use of corporate control to expropriate some or all of
the value of a minority shareholder's interest in a closely held corporation. F.H.
O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
§§ 1:02-:03, at 1-3 to 1-7 (2nd ed. 1995). Although multifarious methods exist to
accomplish the expropriation, a common tactic involves the firing of an employee
shareholder. Id. § 3:06. Although the Wenzel pledgees had formerly owned a majority
block of shares, at the time of the actionable misconduct they were not shareholders,
much less employee-shareholders. Id. at 640.
220. 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), petition for review denied, (Minn. Feb. 27,
1996).
221. Id. at 22.
222. No. C6-93-360, 1993 WL 319036 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1993), petition for
review denied, (Minn. Oct. 28, 1993).
223. Id. at *2.
224. No. C5-92-680, 1992 WL 383460 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1992), petition for
review denied, (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).
225. Id. at *3 (citing Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984),
petition for review denied, (Minn. June 12, 1984)).
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not a derivative corporate claim."226 The case failed, however,
to explain why defendant's actions constituted a breach of that
direct duty.
2 27
Thus at present, close corporations in Minnesota partake of
Minnesota's general rule. As phrased by most recent cases that
rule mandates a derivative suit unless the plaintiff-shareholder
has suffered an injury "separate and distinct" from other
shareholders. Unfortunately, this rule is flawed in concept and
at odds with the weight of authority. Moreover, the rule has
pushed the supreme court into contortions and threatens to
squelch an entire category of extremely important shareholder
claims.
The conceptual error reflects a misunderstanding of the
essential character of a truly derivative claim and a misplacement
of the "separate injury" requirement. When a shareholder
derives his standing from the injury done to the corporation, the
suit is derivative. 22 ' To have a direct claim a plaintiff indeed
must have a separate injury-but separate from the corporation, not
necessarily from fellow shareholders.
The misunderstanding as to "separate from whom" arises
from a misreading of Minnesota's seminal cases on the di-
rect/derivative issue. Those cases, both captioned Seitz v.
Michael, were decided in 1921.29 They both involved claims
that the defendant majority shareholder had misappropriated
corporate funds and had conspired to freeze-out a minority
shareholder from participation in management. 23
0
226. Id.
227. The court may have reached the right conclusion for the wrong reason. The
defendant's misconduct did first harm the corporation; the defendant misappropriated
corporate assets by transferring corporate property to himself without the plaintiffs
knowledge or consent. Id. at *1. It is unclear whether the plaintiffs objection to the
misconduct led to the plaintiff being fired or whether the plaintiff simply walked off the
job. Id. If the defendant terminated plaintiffs employment, either actually or
constructively, plaintiff indeed had a direct, freeze-out claim. See Pedro v. Pedro, 489
N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), petition for review denied, (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992); supra
text accompanying notes 24-26 (discussing the classic freeze-out). If not, under the
special circumstances of the case, the plaintiff might have been able to transmute what
was essentially a derivative claim into a direct claim. See infra Part VI.
228. See supra part II.B.
229. Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102 (1921) [hereinafter Seitz 1]; Seitz
v. Michel, 148 Minn. 474, 181 N.W. 106 (1921) [hereinafter Seitz I/].
230. Seitz , 148 Minn. at 87, 181 N.W. at 105; Seitz II, 148 Minn. at 475, 181 N.W.
at 106.
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The supreme court held the claims to be derivative,21' and
most of the court's discussion focussed on the indirect nature of
the plaintiff's injury. For example, in Seitz I the court stated,
"The wrongs complained of are wrongs against the corpora-
tion."23 2 Seitz II noted similarly, "The injury is to the corpora-
tions [sic] ."2s Thus, as to both the wrong and the remedy, the
court explained, the shareholder had only a derivative relation-
ship: "The wrong is done when the funds are improperly
expended. Such funds do not belong to the stockholders, but
to the corporation."3 4
Seitz I did mention, almost in passing, a consequence of the
indirect nature of the injury: "The wrong done [to the corpora-
tion] results in injury to the stockholders collectively. Money
which might have been distributed among them as dividends has
been wasted. The value of all the stock has been diminished.
The injury to each stockholder is of the same character. "235
Unfortunately, this latter observation has become the focus
of most modem Minnesota cases. These cases have simply
ignored the crux of the analysis in the Seitz cases-i.e., the
indirectness of the shareholder's injury-and have instead
fixated on the "same character" notion. In Northwest Racquet
Swim and Health Clubs, Inc., v. Deloitte & Touche,236 for example,
the supreme court stated: "[T]he method in Minnesota for
distinguishing between a direct and a derivative claim is to
consider whether the injury to the individual plaintiff is separate
and distinct from the injury to other persons in a similar
situation as the plaintiff."
2 7
The Eighth Circuit took the same view in Arent v. Distribu-
tion Sciences, Inc.,2 8 applying Minnesota law and noting: "A
well-recognized method for determining whether a claim belongs
231. The Seitz cases predate recognition of shareholder freeze-out claims. "It is a
matter of no consequence that ... the wrongful acts alleged were done with the specific
intent and fraudulent design of injuring plaintiff [minority shareholder]." Seitz I, 148
Minn. at 88, 181 N.W. at 105. The Seitz cases would be decided differently under the
rule proposed in Section VI, because current law recognizes a direct claim for
fraudulent conduct. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1 (b)(2).
232. Seitz , 148 Minn. at 87, 181 N.W. at 105.
233. Seitz II, 148 Minn. at 476, 181 N.W. at 106.
234. Seitz , 148 Minn. at 87, 181 N.W. at 105.
235. Id. at 87-88, 181 N.W. at 105 (emphasis added).
236. 535 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1995).
237. Id. at 617 (citing Seitz fl).
238. 975 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992).
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to the corporation, rather than its shareholders, is to inquire
whether '[t]he injury to each stockholder is of the same
character.'"23 9 Arent arose from a failed merger, and the
plaintiffs contended that the defendant had committed fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty by
failing to notify shareholders that the proposed merger would
fail. The court held the claims to be derivative, because any
such conduct would have adversely "affected all ... shareholders
equally."2" A federal district court has ruled likewise in anoth-
er case, holding that "under Minnesota law, a claim belongs to
the corporation if the injury to each shareholder 'is of the same
character."241
A few modern cases have at least mentioned the Seitz
indirect injury analysis, but have mostly failed to use that analysis
to decide the direct/derivative issue. For example, International
Broadcasting Corp. v. Turner 42 first noted that "[w]hether a
claim is properly brought as an individual action rather than
derivative turns on whether the claimant has suffered an injury
distinct from one incurred by the corporation."243 Ultimately, howev-
er, the case characterized the claims as derivative because the
"[wrongful acts] cannot be said to have inflicted an injury on
[complainants] separate and distinct from all shareholders. . ...244
Wenzel v. Mathies24 perceived the two aspects of the Seitz analy-
sis as interchangeable: "A derivative action is required when the
shareholder has suffered a harm that is indistinct from the harm
suffered by other shareholders or by the corporation itself."24
Skoglund v. Brady47 is a salutary exception, reflecting both
strands of the Seitz analysis, but applying the indirect injury test.
The court first notes that "[a] shareholder may bring a direct
action when the shareholder alleges a direct injury to the
239. Id. at 1372 (citing Seitz 1).
240. Id. at 1373.
241. In re Nuveen Fund Litigation, 855 F. Supp. 950, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying
Minnesota law, citing Seitz I, and characterizing as derivative a claim that the issuance
of new shares had caused wrongful dilution).
242. 734 F. Supp. 383 (D. Minn. 1990).
243. Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. 542 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), petition for review denied, (Minn. Mar.
28, 1996).
246. Id. at 640.
247. 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. CL App. 1995), petition for review denied, (Minn. Feb. 27,
1996). See supra notes 152-63 and accompanying text for the facts in Skogiund
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shareholder that is separate and distinct from the injury to the corpora-
tion."248 Then court then appears to change standards, assert-
ing that "[to determine whether a claim belongs to the
corporation rather than to its shareholders, the relevant inquiry
is 'whether [t]he injury to each stockholder is of the same charac-
ter."'249 Finally, the court resolves the issue and decides the
case on the proper grounds-stating that "[plaintiff] does not
allege an injury to himself that is separate and distinct from any
injury to the corporation. The district court properly dismissed
[plaintiff's] direct action. "250
With the exception of Skoglund, all the modern cases make
the same mistake: the "fallacy of affirming the consequent."5'
That is, as the Seitz cases quite properly observed, as a matter of
policy and standing an indirect injury gives rise only to a
derivative suit. As those cases also observed, as a matter of
consequence when a shareholder's injury is indirect, all sharehold-
ers have in common the same (indirect) injury.25 2 It does not
logically follow, however, that whenever shareholders have a
common injury they necessarily suffered their injury indirectly.
In logical terms, the error is as follows:
if P then Q (if indirect, then necessarily common)
does not mean
if Q then P (if common, then necessarily indirect)
Besides suffering from this logical fallacy, the current
Minnesota rule is at odds with authoritative decisions from other
jurisdictions. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court has
stated: "The distinction between derivative and individual actions
rests upon the party being directly injured by the alleged
wrongdoing."25 The California Supreme Court has taken the
248. Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 21 (emphasis added) (citing Arent v. Distribution
Sciences, Inc., 975 F.2d 1370, 1372-74 (8th Cir. 1992)).
249. Id. (emphasis added; internal quotations and citations omitted).
250. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
251. STEPHEN F. BARKER, THE ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 69 (5th ed. 1989).
252. This consequence is reflected in rule 23.06 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires a derivative plaintiff to "fairly and adequately represent the
interest of the shareholders ... similarly situated. . . ." MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06.
253. Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988).
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same view: "The individual wrong necessary to support a suit by
a shareholder need not be unique to that plaintiff. The same
injury may affect a substantial number of shareholders. If the
injury is not incidental to an injury to the corporation, an
individual cause of action exists."
254
The defects of the current rule may be dawning on the
Minnesota Supreme Court, if Northwest Racquet Swim and Health
Clubs, Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche 55 is any indication. The case
considered a debenture holder's claim against the accounting
firm which had prepared an audit report on the issuer.
According to the plaintiff, the audit report had included specific
misrepresentations and those representations had directly
affected the decision to purchase the debentures.2 56 The court
quite properly held that the claim could be maintained as a
direct suit.25 7
The court's route to that eminently sensible and seemingly
self-evident conclusion was not easy, however, for the court cited
Seitz 1I for the notion that "the method in Minnesota for
distinguishing between a direct and a derivative claim is to
consider whether the injury to the individual plaintiff is separate
and distinct from the injury to other persons in a similar
situation as the plaintiff."2 58 Since the audit report had affect-
ed more than one debenture holder,2 59 the plaintiff in North-
west Racquet could clearly not make this "separate and distinct"
showing. The court escaped that difficulty by analogizing the
plaintiffs case to cases decided in other jurisdictions which had
allowed direct claims from groups of similarly situated individuals.
260
Tortured reasoning is not the only consequence of the
254. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969); see also COX ET
AL., supra note 13, § 15.3, at 15.23-.24 ("Some courts have reasoned that a derivative
action is the only basis for a shareholder to complain unless the shareholder has
suffered a harm different from that of the other minority stockholders. This is
erroneous."); DEMoTT, supra note 1, § 2.01, at 2-2 to 2-3 (stating that the proper
distinct injury requirement demands not that each shareholder's injury be distinct from
each other shareholder's, but rather that the shareholder's injury be distinct from the
corporate injury).
255. 535 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1995).
256. Id. at 619.
257. Id. at 617.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 618 (discussing University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923
F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1991)).
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Minnesota rule. Sometimes the rule produces indefensible
outcomes. For example, in Arent v. Distribution Sciences, Inc.,
2 61
the plaintiffs contended that the defendant had committed
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty
by failing to notify shareholders that a proposed merger was
destined to fail.262 Although the plaintiffs alleged that the
fraud directly infected their investment decisions concerning
their stock,263 the Eighth Circuit applied Minnesota law and
held the claims to be derivative. In the court's view, any miscon-
duct would have adversely "affected all ... shareholders
equally.
26
Comparably dire consequences are also possible for
shareholder claims brought in the context of a hostile takeover.
Suppose a board of directors is resisting such a takeover for
inappropriate reasons or with inappropriate measures.265 Or
suppose the directors have been "charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company," but act in
a way that undercuts rather than maximizes shareholder
value.266 Under the nation's leading cases, the shareholders
would have a direct claim, whether for injunctive relief or
damages.267 Under the Minnesota rule, no shareholder would
have a claim, since each shareholder would be facing the "same
character" of injury.2"
Whether or not Minnesota needs a special rule for resolving
the direct/derivative distinction in close corporations, the state's
general rule needs to be fixed. Courts should return to the
261. 975 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992).
262. Id. at 1372 (citing Seitz 1).
263. Id. at 1372.
264. Id. at 1373.
265. SeeUnocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,955 (Del. 1985) (noting
the dangers of director self-interest and entrenchment and requiring directors of a
Delaware corporation to justify defensive measures by proving that they have acted in
good faith and upon a reasonable investigation and that the defensive measures are
proportionate to the threat).
266. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (holding that once directors conclude that a Delaware corporation is up for sale,
the directors have a duty to shareholders to use reasonable efforts to maximize the price
the shareholders will realize from their interests); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
864 (Del. 1985) (holding directors of a Delaware corporation directly liable to the
former shareholders for having failed, through gross negligence, to obtain adequate
value for those shareholders when the corporation was being merged out of existence).
267. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 266.
268. Arent, 975 F.2d at 1372 (quoting Seitz 1).
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original crux of Seitz I, discard the "same character" test and
adopt the rule prevailing elsewhere: The key to determining
whether a shareholder's suit is direct or derivative is not whether
other shareholders are similarly situated but rather whether the
plaintiff shareholder has been injured directly.
VI. WHETHER AND WHITHER A SPECIAL RULE
Fixing the general rule occasions the further question:
Should Minnesota adopt a special rule applicable only in close
corporations? Several other states have done so,269 as has the
American Law Institute in its Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance.270  At least three arguments exist for doing so under
Minnesota law: (i) Minnesota Statutes section 302A.751 reflects
a special solicitude for minority shareholders in close corpora-
tions and that solicitude warrants relaxing whatever general rule
is applicable to the direct/derivative distinction; (ii) when a
corporation is closely held, there is a greater likelihood that both
direct and derivative claims will arise from the same circumstanc-
269. See, e.g., Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). The Richards
court held that:
If a corporation is closely held, a court, in its discretion, may treat an
action raising derivative claims as a direct action... if it finds to do
so will not (1) unfairly expose the corporation to a multiplicity of
actions; (2) materially prejudice the interests of creditors in the
corporation; or (8) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery
among all interested persons.
Id. at 648. See also Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding former
stockholder may maintain a direct suit for misappropriation of corporate assets against
former director of now dissolved close corporation where the reasons underlying a
derivative suit are not present); Thomas v. Dickson, 301 S.E.2d 49, 51 (Ga. 1983)
(holding suit brought by one-third minority shareholder in close corporation against
majority shareholders may be brought as a direct action rather than derivative "because
[plaintiff shareholder] was the sole injured shareholder and because the reasons
underlying the general rule calling for corporate recovery do not exist in this case");
W & W Equip. Co. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding a
shareholder who held 50% of shares in a close corporation which had only two
shareholders was not required to bring a derivative suit to assert breaches of fiduciary
duty against fellow shareholder director where the underlying reasons for requiring a
derivative action are not present and plaintiff would have no difficulty satisfying re-
quirement for maintaining derivative action). But see Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1990) (contrasting Delaware and Ohio Law,
applying Delaware law and refusing to recognize any special rule for close corpora-
tions), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991); Bessette v. Bessette, 434 N.E.2d 206, 208 n.5
(Mass. 1982) (applying traditional rule in the absence of a claim for a freeze-out).
270. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 212, § 7.01(d). See infra
text accompanying note 315.
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es, and that this potential overlap requires special attention; and
(iii) when a corporation is closely held, the reasons for maintain-
ing the direct/derivative distinction disappear. This Part will
consider each argument in turn.
A. The Impact of Minnesota Statutes Section 302A. 751
It has been suggested that "section 302A.751 was intended
to supersede Rule 23.06 in cases involving closely held corpora-
tions" 27' and that, in effect, close corporation plaintiffs should
be allowed to sue directly even where the general rule would
require a derivative suit.2 72  For at least three reasons, this
271. PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d at 14 n.1 (YetkaJ., dissenting).
272. Id. Justice Yetka also invoked Minnesota Statutes § 302A.467, suggesting that
it too served to destroy the direct/derivative distinction in closely held corporations.
Id. Section 302A.467 provides:
If a corporation or an officer or director of the corporation violates
a provision of this chapter, a court in this state may, in an action
brought by a shareholder of the corporation, grant any equitable
relief it deems just and reasonable in the circumstances and award
expenses, including attorneys' fees and disbursements, to the
shareholder.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.467 (1994). The majority in PJAcquisition ignored justice Yetka's
suggestion as to § 302A.467, and the suggestion finds no support in Minnesota case law.
Indeed, while only a handful of cases have cited the provision, one of them expressly
rejects the notion that § 302A.467 affects the direct/derivative issue. In Westgor v.
Grimm, 381 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), after remand from the supreme court,
the court of appeals stated:
The supreme court. already ruled in this case that Westgor "has
no individual cause of action because a right of action for diversion
of corporate funds is in the corporation, not the individual."
Therefore, Westgor cannot personally receive any damages as a result
of his claims. Furthermore, we do not agree that the equitable relief
available under § 302A.467 authorizes the court to force a buyout of
dissenting shareholders when such a buyout could not be obtained
under the "dissenting shareholder buyout" provisions of Minn. Stat.
§ 302A.471 (1984).
Id. at 881 (citation omitted); see also Bowman v. MWCG Export Co., No. C4-90-1654,
1991 WL 30342 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1991) finding that:
The trial court also properly refused to order the corporation to buy
out the Bowmans' shares as equitable relief under Minn. Stat.
§ 302A.467 (1988). Minn. Stat. § 302A.467 does not authorize a
court to order a buy-out when buy-out is not available as a dissenting
shareholder right under Minn. Stat. § 302A.471. Because Minn. Stat.
§ 302A.471 buy-out was unavailable to the Bowmans, we affirm the
trial court's refusal to order a buy-out of the Bowmans' shares as
equitable relief under Minn. Stat. § 302A.467.
Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
Most of the cases citing section 302A.467 have merely referred to the section's role
in authorizing equitable remedies and attorney's fees. See, e.g., Foy v. Klapmeier, Nos.
3-90 CIV 292, 3-90 CIV 293, 1993 WL 246127, at *9 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 1993) ("Under
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suggestion lacks merit. First, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
expressly rejected the suggestion. In PJ Acquisition the court
stated: "While [section] 302A.751, subd. 1 (1988) does expand
the options of shareholders to bring actions seeking personal
damages, as distinguished from derivative damages, the equitable
remedy expanded does not replace the traditional derivative
action."273
At the symposium that gave rise to this article, one partici-
pant did attempt to characterize PJAcquisition's observations on
the direct/derivative issue as mere dicta. That participant
asserted in essence that (i) the court made its core holding in
this aspect of the case when it decided that the contemporane-
ous ownership rule applied and (ii) once the court had made
that unremarkable pronouncement, the rest was mere philoso-
phizing.
The majority opinion clearly repudiates that assertion.
Footnote 12 states that:
In this case we need not hold that a shareholder
plaintiff alleging actions causing him direct damag-
es under 302A.751, subd. 1, must always have to
satisfy the contemporaneous ownership and de-
mand requirements of rule 23.06. But where proper
analysis of the complaint leads to the conclusion that
indeed, the action is derivative, the Rule 23.06 require-
ment must be met.
2 74
section 302A.467, a court may grant an award of attorneys' fees to a shareholder if a
corporation or an officer or director of the corporation has violated a statutory duty
toward the shareholder."), affd as modified and remanded 992 F.2d 774, 779 (8th Cir.
1993) (holding that, given an established usurpation of corporate opportunity and the
plaintiff's established right to seek appraisal, section 302A.467 authorized the court to
include the value of the usurped opportunity when making the appraisal valuation);
Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 209 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) ("In the event
an action has been pursued, section 302A.467 allows a court to fashion equitable
remedies."), petition for review denied, (Minn. Aug. 24, 1988); Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Nos.
C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991) (holding
that § 302A.467 "permits a court, in its discretion, to award attorney fees for any
violation of chapter 302A if it finds such an award will be reasonably equitable under
the circumstances. No specific findings as to bad faith, arbitrary, or vexatious conduct
are required."); Chabot v. Industrial Relations Council, Inc., No. C8-90-300, 1990 WL
119371, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1990) (noting that, given an established
violation of section 302A751, section 302A.467 authorized "imposing remedies against
[a miscreant] individually").
273. PJAcquisition, 453 N.W.2d at 5-6.
274. Id. at 6 n.12 (emphasis added).
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As this passage demonstrates, the court first determined that the
case was properly a derivative case. From that determination,
the court concluded that: (a) the demand and contemporaneous
ownership requirements applied in the case; and (b) it was
unnecessary to determine whether those requirements apply in
a direct suit.
The second and third reasons confirm that the PJAcquisition
holding makes good sense, both as a matter of statutory interpre-
tation and as a matter of public policy. The direct/derivative
distinction is fundamental to corporate jurisprudence.275 If the
legislature had intended to take the radical step of overturning
that distinction, it is unlikely that they would have done so sub
silentio. This argument is especially strong given the myriad of
provisions in which the legislature has explicitly created new or
special rules for close corporations.
2 7 6
As for public policy, if Minnesota Statutes section 302A.751
means the wholesale elimination of the direct/derivative
distinction in close corporations, then a sole disgruntled
shareholder will have inordinate power to disrupt the corpora-
tion. This problem transcends the issue of "strike suits" 277 and
is best explained with an example drawn from Skoglund v.
Brady,78 the court of appeals' most noteworthy recent decision
dealing with the direct/derivative distinction in a close corpora-
275. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 943-44. Cf Cox ET AL., supra note 13,
§ 15.3, at 15.220 (discussing the rationale for continuing to distinguish the derivative
suit from the individual suit); see DEMOTr, supra note 1, § 1:01, at 1-1, 1-2, § 2:01, at 2-1,
2-2. The distinction results from applying a concept fundamental to all U.S. jurispru-
dence-i.e., standing-to one of the most fundamental notions of corporate law-i.e.,
the relationship inter se the participants in a corporate enterprise.
276. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A-011, subd. 6a (defining closely held corporation);
§ 302A.751, subds. 1 (b)(2), (3) (establishing special protections for shareholders in
their capacities as officers or employees of a close corporation); § 302A751, subd. 3a
(providing considerations in granting relief involving closely held corporations); §
302A.751, subd. 2 (detailing buy-out remedy for close corporations). Subdivision 2 was
amended in 1994 to expand its purview to all corporations that are not publicly held.
1994 Minn. Laws ch. 417, § 10.
277. A strike suit is a suit "maintained by irresponsible shareholders who [are]
motivated by the prospect of a quick settlement rather than by the best interests of the
corporation." BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 121, § 9:01, at 9-2. For a more narrow
definition, see PJ Acquisition Corp., 453 N.W.2d at 14 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (defining
strike suit as "a suit brought by a plaintiff who purchased a nominal interest in a
corporation in order to bring a lawsuit").





The plaintiff in Skoglund was a passive investor, who had
suffered no direct injury. He had not been terminated from a
corporate position2 "° and had been denied no rights incidental
to his status as a shareholder.21  He alleged and objected to
corporate injuries-waste and self-dealing.2 2  There were
several other, similarly situated passive investors, none of whom
chose to join the plaintiff in the suit.
288
Allowing the plaintiff to proceed with his direct claims
would have caused several inequities. First, in a matter that
demanded considerable attention from corporate managers and
considerable corporate resources,2 8 4 a single shareholder would
have wrested control of the corporation away from its directors
and, moreover, from a disinterested special litigation commit-
tee.285 This would have occurred even though the plaintiff had
suffered no direct injury, had no personal interest directly at
stake and had not garnered any support from other similarly
situated investors. Second, any direct remedy accorded to the
plaintiff would have benefitted him to the exclusion and
detriment of the other shareholders and would have amounted
279. Other aspects of Skoglund are discussed supra notes 153-64.
280. Cf Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798,802-03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (shareholder
terminated as employee despite reasonable expectation of life-time employment),
petition for review denied, (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
281. Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 19. Cf Warthan v. Midwest Consol. Ins. Agencies, 450
N.W.2d 145 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (involving, inter alia, denial of shareholders' rights
to vote on asset sale and denial of access to corporate books and records); Henricksen
v. Big League Game Co., No. CO-95-388, 1995 WL 550935 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 19,
1995) (involving, inter alia, unauthorized issuance of stock which prevented plaintiff
shareholder from exercising preemptive rights); Chabot v. Industrial Relations Council,
Inc., No. 8720942 (St. Louis County Dist. Ct. Nov. 27, 1989), affd, No. C8-90-300, 1990
WL 119371 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1990) (involving, inter alia, denial of access to
corporate files and reduction of work hours and salary); Frenzel v. Logistics, Inc., No.
457733 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1985) (involving, inter ala, denial of access
to corporate books and records and elimination of cumulative voting).
282. Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 19.
283. Letter from Gene A. Hoff, attorney for Instrumentation Services, Inc. (June 18,
1996) (on file with authors).
284. See Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 19 (noting the special litigation committee's finding
that "expenses associated with the lawsuit" were, prior to the trial court decision and the
appeal, probably in excess of $54,000).
285. See id. at 19-20 (noting (i) that neither the one-person SLC nor the accounting
firm retained by the committee "had any prior relationship" with the corporation, its
directors or the plaintiff, (ii) the trial court had found that the SLC "was independent
and conducted its investigations in good faith" and (iii) at the trial court level the
plaintiff had not even challenged the committee's independence).
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to a mandatory, preferential distribution of corporate assets to
the plaintiff. Such a result may be warranted when a sharehold-
er has directly suffered oppression, s6 but not where a share-
holder is merely riding piggyback on a harm to the corporation.
The position taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court in PJ
Acquisition thus makes good sense. Moreover, that position is
consistent with decisions interpreting statutes similar to Minneso-
ta Statutes section 302A.751. Although few cases have directly
addressed the issue, they all have expressly required a direct
injury.
In Sax v. World Wide Press, Inc.,2s7 for example, the Ninth
Circuit dismissed a direct action alleging corporate waste under
a statute similar to section 302A.751 because the complaining
shareholder had failed to establish a direct injury.28s The
minority shareholder had sought liquidation of the corporation,
alleging that after he had stopped working for the corporation
the majority shareholders had "conspired to deplete [the
corporate] assets and depreciate the value of his stock ....
The court concluded that, although the statute allowed a
shareholder to obtain liquidation through a direct action, "the
shareholder must first identify illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent
acts which have injured him personally."2 0 "[R]equiring a
shareholder to establish personal injury and not just corporate
injury in a direct shareholder action," noted the Ninth Circuit,
"will... reduce the volume of litigation in Montana courts. "291
Likewise, in River Management Corp. v. Lodge Properties,
Inc.,
29 2 the Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed a minority
shareholder's direct claims for waste and mismanagement under
a statute similar to section 302A.751, holding that such claims
alleged injury to the corporation and could only be raised in a
286. See supra notes 44-47 (discussing buy-outs as the primary remedy in freeze-out
cases).
287. 809 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1987).
288. Id. at 616 (applying MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-921 (repealed 1991) which
provided that a corporation can be liquidated by a shareholder when it is established
that the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are illegal,
oppressive or fraudulent).
289. Id. at 612.
290. Id. at 613-16 (citations omitted).
291. Id. The statute involved in Sax was repealed in 1991 and was replaced by
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938 (1995). The replacement is nearly identical, suggesting
that the Sax analysis still applies.
292. 829 P.2d 398 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
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derivative suit.29 Gimpel v. Bolstein294 supports the same view,
albeit with more oblique language. A minority shareholder
brought a direct suit seeking dissolution pursuant to a statute
similar to section 302A.751 and a derivative suit alleging waste of
corporate assets and oppression. 95 The plaintiff argued that
dissolution was proper under a section of the statute allowing
relief "when the property or assets of the corporation are being
looted, wasted, or diverted for non-corporate purposes by its
directors, officers or those in control of the corporation. "296
The court responded that plaintiffs "allegations, even if true,
would notjustify dissolution of the corporation. [The plaintiff's]
derivative action, wherein these same allegations are made,
provides a sufficient remedy for any wrong that may have been
done by these acts."
297
293. Id. at 403-04. The court went on to find that the majority shareholder had
breached its fiduciary duties by committing acts of oppression against the minority
shareholder. Id. at 403.
294. 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
295. Id. at 1016.
296. Id. at 1021 (quoting N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a(a)(2) (McKinney, 1986)).
297. Id. There are a few cases which, on casual "reading, might appear to take a
contrary approach. However, none of these cases have actually ruled to the contrary,
and in fact each case involved some direct injury to the plaintiff. For example, in
Kalabogias v. Georgou, 627 N.E.2d 51 (111. App. Ct. 1993), cert. denied, 631 N.E.2d 709
(Ill. 1994), the court applied a statute similar to section 302A.751 and stated:
The rationale underlying this remedy is to protect the interest of
minority shareholders against majority shareholders who "reap the
benefits of ownership through compensation and other withdrawals
not available to the minority." Thus, direct actions for dissolution
enable minority shareholders to recover their investment from the
corporation when no other methods are available.
Id. at 57 (citations omitted). The court found that the minority shareholders had
established sufficient evidence of illegal and fraudulent conduct and held the majority
shareholders personally liable to the minority shareholders. Id. at 58. Some of the
evidence reflected corporate harm-e.g. testimony that one of the defendants was
"skimming... off the top of the [corporation's] gross receipts." Id. at 54. There were
also significant direct injuries, however. The majority shareholders fired one of the
minority shareholders, while the other left his position soon after the firing of the first.
Id. In such circumstances, there is nothing remarkable about recognizing a direct
claim. See infra part VI.B. (explaining that, when genuine direct claims co-exist with
derivative claims, a shareholder has standing to assert the direct claims).
Schirmer v. Bear, 648 N.E.2d 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), appeal granted, 660 N.E.2d
1280 (Ill. 1995), is another Illinois case similar to Kalabogias. Pursuant to a statute
comparable to section 302A.751, a minority shareholder brought suit seeking dissolution
of the corporation, or in the alternative, an order directing the corporation to buy his
shares. Although the decision does not discuss the direct/derivative issue, the facts show
that the plaintiff suffered a direct injury. Id. at 1131. The majority shareholder "acted
illegally in removing the plaintiff from the board of directors." Id. at 1134.
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In short, if there is a basis for setting aside the
direct/derivative distinction in some close corporation cases, that
basis lies elsewhere. It does not derive from an overexpansive
reading of section 302A.751.
298
B. The Overlap between Direct and Derivative Claims
A corporation's closely held nature can produce situations
in which both derivative and genuinely direct claims are
involved. Sometimes this overlap follows from the multifarious
nature of the alleged misconduct.219  Sometimes the overlap
occurs when those in control of the corporation retaliate against
a shareholder who has raised a corporate concern."° In either
event, the result should be the same. The existence of derivative
claims should not preclude a shareholder from asserting a claim
that is genuinely personal and direct.
This is already the unstated rule in Minnesota, as evidenced
by a string of cases involving overlaps. Warthan v. Midwest
Consolidated Insurance Agencies,"'1 for example, involved misap-
propriation of corporate assets through a self-dealing transaction
which transferred substantially all of the corporation's assets to
another corporation controlled by the first corporation's
directors.0 2 This misconduct plainly raised a derivative claim,
but the defendants had also violated the minority shareholders'
A Michigan court ordered dissolution under a statute similar to § 302A.75 1, finding
that the majority shareholders had breached their fiduciary duties to the minority
shareholders by breaching the parties' oral agreement and diverting corporate funds.
Salvadore v. Connor. 276 N.W.2d 458, 463-64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). Not only did the
breach of agreement cause direct injury, but the corporate waste claims had an unusual,
direct aspect. Id. The disbursements were made without the consent of the minority
shareholders, who were members of the board of directors. Id. at 463.
298. Even Justice Yetka's dissent obliquely acknowledged that the direct/derivative
distinction makes sense in some close corporation cases. PJ Acquisition Corp. v.
Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 1990) (Yetka, J., dissenting) (stating that "Courts
and commentators have recognized that, in certain cases involving closely held corporations,
the reasons for distinguishing between derivative and direct actions do not exist...
(emphasis added).
299. See, e.g., cases discussed infra at note 307.
300. This was the situation in Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992), petition for review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). The excluded shareholder's
trouble began when he questioned an apparent discrepancy in the company's books.
Id. at 800.
301. 450 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
302. Id. at 149.
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rights directly-no vote had been taken on the asset sale,
303
and the minority shareholders had been denied access to
corporate books and records. 4 Without commenting on the
overlap or indeed on the direct/derivative issue, the court
allowed a direct suit.
Similar circumstances produced a similar result in Wheeler v.
McGee."°5 The suit involved both conversion of corporate assets
as well as an effective end to the plaintiff's employment with the
corporation.0 6 The former claim should have been derivative,
while the latter was direct. Again without reference to the
direct/derivative issue, the court permitted a direct suit."0 7
These cases were decided correctly. "The general princi-
ple ... is that a direct action is not precluded simply because
the same facts could also give rise to a derivative action."30'
That proposition does not, however, end the inquiry. There
remains the question of how to handle the derivative claims. At
least two possibilities exist: (i) keep the derivative claims separate
and determine whether the direct plaintiff can be a fair and
303. Id. The Warthan court cited Minnesota Statutes § 302A.661, subdivision 2,
which requires shareholder approval for the sale of"substantially all of [a corporation's]
property and assets, including its goodwill, not in the usual and regular course of its
business .... " Id.
304. Id. Section 302A.461 entitles shareholders to have access to certain books and
records of the corporation. MINN. STAT. § 302A461.
305. No. C5-92-680, 1992 WL 383460 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1992), petition for
review denied, (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).
306. Id. at *1.
307. See also Chabot v. Industrial Relations Council, Inc., No. 8720942 (St. Louis
County Dist. Ct. Nov. 27, 1989) (involving conversion of corporate assets (derivative),
but also denial of access to corporate files and reduction of work hours and salary
(direct); allowing a direct suit), affid, No. C8-90-300, 1990 WL 119371 (Minn. Ct. App.
Aug. 21, 1990); Frenzel v. Logistics, Inc., No. 457733 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Oct. 31,
1985) (involving usurpation of corporate opportunities and self-dealing (derivative), but
also a denial of access to corporate books and records and elimination of cumulative
voting (direct); allowing a direct suit). Grogan v. Garner, 806 F.2d 829, 833-34 (8th Cir.
1986), reflects the same phenomenon, involving a misappropriation of corporate assets
and property (derivative), but also fraud and misrepresentation in inducing the plaintiff
shareholders to agree to the sale of the corporation (direct). While the case applies
Missouri law, it has been frequently cited by courts applying Minnesota law. See, e.g.,
Arent v. Distribution Sciences, Inc., 975 F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying
Minnesota law); International Broadcasting Corp. v. Turner, 734 F. Supp. 383, 392 (D.
Minn. 1990) (applying Minnesota law); Northwest Racquet Swim & Health Clubs, Inc.
v. Deloitte & Touche, No. C9-94-301, 1994 WL 481345, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 6,
1994), rev'd, 535 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1995).
308. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 944; see also Moran Household Int4'l Inc.,
490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch.) affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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adequate representative for those claims 09 or (ii) fold the
derivative harms into the direct suit. Before evaluating these
possibilities, it is necessary to consider the third proposed
rationale for having a special rule for close corporations.
C. No Reason, No Rule: When the Distinction Makes No Difference
Several jurisdictions have allowed close corporation plaintiffs
to bring direct claims despite the traditional direct/derivative
distinction. For example, in Watson v. Button,310 the Ninth
Circuit allowed a claim alleging that a former manager of a
dissolved close corporation had misappropriated corporate assets
to proceed as a direct suit.3 11  In Thomas v. Dickson,312 the
Georgia Supreme Court allowed a direct claim where the
plaintiff shareholder was the sole injured party.
3 13
The rationale for these decisions was straightforward.
Certain circumstances justify the direct/derivative distinction in
ordinary corporations. In close corporations those circumstances
might not exist. If they do not, there is no reason to preserve
the distinction they justify
3 14
This rationale has been adopted by the American Law
Institute in its Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations. Section 7.01 (d) states:
In the case of a closely held corporation, the court in its
discretion may treat an action raising derivative claims as a
309. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (discussing the fair and adequate
representation requirement).
310. 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956).
311. Id. at 236-37.
312. 301 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1983).
313. Id. at 51; see also Kirk v. First Nat'l Bank, 439 F. Supp. 1141, 1148-49 (M.D. Ga.
1977) (allowing former shareholders to bring direct action against former president
who allegedly caused diminution in value of their previously owned shares by
misappropriating corporate assets); Caswell v.Jordan, 362 S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987) (permitting the minority shareholder to bring direct suit against corporation's
president and president's wife for plundering and looting corporate assets), cert. denied,
(Ga. Feb. 5, 1988).
314. Watson, 235 F.2dat236-37; Kirk, 439F. Supp. at 1149; Thomas, 301 S.E.2dat51;
CasweU, 362 S.E.2d at 773. Both Thomas and Kirk cite the rationale provided in Watson.
The Watson court explained the general rule "that a stockholder of a corporation has
no personal right of action against directors or officers who have defrauded or
mismanaged it and thus affected the value of the stock." Watson, 235 F.2d at 236-37.
However, the Watson court stated an exception to the general rule that permits a direct




direct action, exempt it from those restrictions and defenses
applicable only to derivative actions, and order an individual
recovery, if it finds that to do so will not (i) unfairly expose
the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions,
(ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the
corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the
recovery among all interested persons. 15
Several courts have followed the ALI approach, including W
& W Equipment Co. v. Mink16 and Richards v. Bryan.17 In the
former, a shareholder in a close corporation brought a direct
suit alleging that the directors had breached their fiduciary
duties by terminating plaintiff's employment, failing to be honest
about the value of retiring shareholder's stock, and threatening
to bleed the corporation of its assets should the plaintiff refuse
to pay the retiring shareholder's requested price.3 18 The court
rejected defendant's claim that plaintiff's suit had to be brought
derivatively, concluding that "the reasons for requiring a
derivative action are not present in this case. 319 More specifi-
cally, the court noted that there were only two shareholders, the
plaintiff was the sole injured shareholder, and there was "thus no
potential for multiplicity of shareholder suits .... 320 In
addition, "there [was] no evidence of any creditor in need of
protection," nor was there "prejudice to other shareholders not
a party to the suit since [the plaintiff was] the only injured
shareholder ...."321 Moreover, the plaintiff "would not be
adequately compensated by a corporate recovery because [the
corporation was] a close corporation with no ready market for
the sale of [the plaintiffs] shares.",
22
In the latter case, Richards v. Bryan, a minority shareholder
in close corporation brought a direct suit against the majority
shareholders alleging that the defendants had effectively frozen
out the plaintiff, denied the plaintiff a reasonable return on
315. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE, supra note 212, § 7.01(d). The ALI
approach does not encompass all previous rationales. For example, Thomas addressed
not only the issues considered by the AL but also whether a derivative suit would
suffice to adequately compensate the injured shareholder. Thomas, 301 S.E.2d at 51.
316. 568 N.E.2d 564, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
317. 879 P.2d 638, 647-48 (Kan. CL App. 1994).
318. W & WEquip. Co., 568 N.E.2d at 573.
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investment, and fraudulently induced the plaintiff to enter a
formation agreement.323 The court permitted the plaintiff to
bring a direct suit for the derivative claims explaining that the
suit "will not expose [the corporation] to a multiplicity of actions
or interfere with a fair distribution of recovery because the
[plaintiff is] the only minority shareholder in the corpora-
tion."3 24  Furthermore, said the court, "there is no indication
that resolution of [plaintiff s] claims will prejudice any creditors'
interests."
3 25
Such cases and reasoning are by no means universal.
Indeed, at present only a handful of decisions reflect the ALI
approach. For example, in Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc.,326 the Seventh Circuit examined Delaware's view of the
matter.27 The case involved a minority shareholder, owning
forty-nine percent of the corporate shares, who had brought a
direct suit against the majority shareholder, who owned fifty-one
percent of the corporate shares.328 The plaintiff claimed that
the majority shareholder had wrongfully competed against the
corporation,329 and the court rejected the direct suit.3 30  The
decision explains that, although Delaware recognizes an
exception to derivative actions when the shareholder suffers a
"special injury," Delaware does not accept the ALI approach and
has no special rules for differentiating direct and derivative
323. Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 641 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
324. Id. at 648.
325. Id; see also PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 1990)
(YetkaJ., dissenting and invoking the AL approach); Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559,
559-60 (Ind. 1995) (invoking the ALI approach and permitting minority shareholder
to bring direct action alleging that majority shareholder had misused corporate assets
by paying himself excessive salaries, using corporate employees without compensating
the corporation, and appropriating corporate funds for personal investments);
Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 797-99 (N.D. 1991) (invoking the ALI
approach and permitting minority shareholder to bring direct action on account of
excessive lease payments and management fees paid to the majority shareholders). The
ALI approach was probably unnecessary in both W & W Equip. and Richards. Each
plaintiff had suffered a direct injury: in W & WEquip., loss of employment, W & W
Equip. Co., 568 N.E.2d at 573; and in Richards, fraud, Richards, 879 P.2d at 646.
326. 916 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991).
327. Id. at 383-84.
328. Id. at 380-81.
329. Id. at 381.
330. Id. at 384 (noting that the plaintiff alleged "direct injuries, which he was free
to litigate, but he could not recover on account of the store-corporation's diminished
profits without making the corporation a party").
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claims within a close corporation.
As to blurring of the direct/derivative line, the decision
states " [ t]he premise of the [ALI] approach may be questioned.
Corporations are not partnerships .... Commercial rules should
be predictable; this objective is best served by treating corpora-
tions as what they are, allowing the investors and other partici-
pants to vary the rules by contract if they think deviations are
warranted."3 2
In any event, Minnesota would be unwise to adopt the ALI
approach in toto or to use it automatically. The ALI approach
can be easily overextended, because the ALI's black letter
underemphasizes a key characteristic of the relevant cases. In
each case that foreshadowed or reflects the ALI approach, all of
the corporation's shareholders were inextricably involved in the
dispute.33 They were either the alleged perpetrators or the
331. Id. at 383-84.
332. Id. at 384.
333. See Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1956) ("[plaintiff] and
[defendant] were the only stockholders at the time of the misappropriation"); Thomas
v. Dickson, 301 S.E.2d 49, 50 (Ga. 1983) (plaintiff shareholder owned one-third of the
corporate stock while defendant majority shareholders owned the remaining two-thirds);
Caswell v. Jordan, 362 S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (plaintiff"is the sole injured
shareholder, the only other shareholders being the [defendants]"), cert. denied, (Ga. Feb.
5, 1988); W & WEquip. Co., 568 N.E.2d 564, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (50% owner of
close corporation brought suit against the other 50% owner); Richards v. Bryan, 879
P.2d 638, 642 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (plaintiff shareholder owned 49% of the corporate
stock while the defendant majority shareholders owned the remaining 51%). Neither
the Principles of Corporate Governance § 7.01 nor its Comments mention this fact.
The Comments, however, note that "[i]n general, when a direct action is brought on
behalf of the entire class of injured shareholders.., there is less reason to insist that
the action be brought derivatively." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note
212, § 7.01 cmt. e. Kirk v. First Nat'l Bank, 439 F. Supp. 1141 (M.D. Ga. 1977) is not
to the contrary. The case allowed a direct suit for claims relating to misappropriation
of corporate funds, even though some of the alleged victims were not parties. Id. at
1148-49. Indeed, the court specifically addressed that issue and discussed the possibility
of "joinder of similarly situated injured parties." Id. at 1149. However, Kirk has no
need of an AI-type rule, even though Kirk discusses Watson v. Button, one of the cases
that presaged the ALI approach. Id. at 1147-48. The plaintiffs in Kirk had sold their
stock in the corporation and alleged that the sale price had been substantially reduced
by fraud. Id. at 1144. Thus, even under conventional doctrine plaintiffs asserted a
substantial claim of direct injury. As the court explained:
Plaintiffs allege... that a substantial factor in determining the
selling price of their shares was book value of those shares; that the
book value figure actually used did not reflect sums owed [the
corporation by one of the defendants] because of misappropriation
of company assets; that the time of the sale [defendants]knew of the
improper valuation or of facts indicating the likelihood of improper
valuation; and that both [defendants], in either misinforming or
1996]
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alleged victims. A direct suit could not "unfairly expose the
corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions"
because all of the participants were parties.
33 4
In some such situations, it does make sense to apply the
notion of an "incorporated partnership" into a new context and
to treat a close corporation as an aggregate of owners rather
than as a separate entity.335  From that perspective, breach of
loyalty claims, whatever their gravamen, appear direct rather
than derivative-just as in a general partnership. 36
It would be very unwise, however, to allow a direct claim just
because all participants are parties. As the ALI itself notes, the
direct/derivative distinction in part reflects a concern for
corporate creditors, and that concern argues against any casual
overriding of the distinction. The ALI approach is significant
only when the malefactors have injured a minority shareholder by
injuring the corporation. If the injury has been direct, convention-
al doctrine suffices to allow a direct suit.3 7 Therefore, whenev-
failing to inform plaintiffs of this material information, are liable for
fraud ....
Id. at 1144. Thus, Kirk is an overlap case. See supra part VI.B. Furthermore, the court
states an additional reason for permitting a direct suit: "all shares of [the corporation]
had changed hands" in the complained-of transaction, and no derivative suit was
possible. Kirk, 439 F. Supp. at 1149.
334. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 212, § 7.01 (d) (i).
335. As explained supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text, the term "incorporated
partnership" influenced courts as they developed the notion that shareholders in a close
corporation owe each other fiduciary duties. Here, as there, the notion of an aggregate
is used as a metaphor. The point is not to deny the legal existence of the entity but
rather to look through the entity to its owners. As a metaphor, the notion of an "incor-
porated partnership" continues to make sense, even though the Revised Uniform
Parmership Act (RUPA) deems a RUPA general partnership to be an entity. R.U.P.A.
§ 201 (1994). The metaphor owes its power to the historical concept of a partnership
as an aggregate of owners.
336. See supra note 1 (discussing the partnership action for an accounting). Cf
McLaughlin v. Wedum Found., Inc., No. C3-91-1784, 1992 WL 31359, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 25, 1992) (holding that Minnesota law does not allow a general partner of
a general partnership to bring a derivative action on behalf of the partnership against
a third party).
337. Grogan v. Garner, 806 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1986) is instructive in this respect.
The case arose following the sale of a corporation and involved both misuse of
corporate assets and misrepresentations connected with shareholder approval of the
sale. Id. at 833-34. As to the direct/derivative issue the court stated:
Had the plaintiffs challenged only the propriety of the pre-closing
sale of STI-Kansas shares to certain employees of the corporation,
then possibly Dawson [a case requiring a derivative suit] would have
been controlling because the plaintiffs would be challenging the
sufficiency of consideration paid for STI-Kansas stock .... However,
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er the ALl approach is significant, there will likely be allegations
of self-dealing, usurpation of corporate opportunity or similar
tactics that have bled the corporation of its assets. It is precisely
this sort of situation in which a derivative suit, with its corporate
rather than individual recovery, is important for the protection
of creditors.
Moreover, allowing a direct suit for indirect injuries is only
appropriate when plaintiffs allege some sort of disloyalty or bad
faith and not for claims of mere mismanagement. Even in a
close corporation, corporate law entitles the majority shareholder
to manage the enterprise,33 and the law should not provide an
ersatz direct claim for every disagreement over business decisions
made by the majority shareholder in good faith.
If the mismanagement is egregious, the minority sharehold-
er can bring a derivative suit. The corporation will likely
respond with a special litigation committee, but that committee's
determination will be a barrier to the plaintiff only if the
committee is independent and conducts its investigation in good
faith. 39 If this is not good enough for the minority sharehold-
er-if the minority shareholder wishes some greater power to
second guess management decisions made in good faith-then
the minority shareholder should make those wishes known
before the fact and should obtain the majority shareholder's
written agreementY
°
the plaintiffs... are claiming that they were defrauded by [the
defendant's] representation [relating to the sale of the corporation]
Id. at 835 n.7. The court, therefore, allowed a direct claim. Id. at 835. As mentioned
supra note 307, Grogan applies Missouri law but has been frequently cited by courts
applying Minnesota law.
338. As Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., explains:
(T]he controlling group in a close corporation must have some room
to maneuver in establishing the business policy of the corporation.
It must have a large measure of discretion, for example, in declaring
or withholding dividends, deciding whether to merge or consolidate,
establishing salaries of corporate officers, dismissing directors with or
without cause, and hiring and firing corporate employees.
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
339. See supra part III.B.
340. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.457 (1994). The statute authorizes a written
shareholder control agreement
that relates to the control of or the liquidation and dissolution of the
corporation, the relations among them, or any phase of the business
and affairs of the corporation, including, without limitation, the man-
agement of its business, the declaration and payment of distributions,
the election of directors or officers, the employment of shareholders
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Even as to claims of disloyalty or bad faith, some further
guidelines are necessary. Not every claim of bad faith should
transmute a derivative claim into a direct one. That transmuta-
tion is appropriate only when the majority shareholder has used
a corporate harm to target the minority shareholder for
oppression.
With that targeting concept in mind, it might seem suffi-
cient to require the plaintiff to allege that the derivative-type
harms were "aimed at minority shareholder." That standard,
however, is too subjective and would allow direct claims even
when the minority shareholder could not show any likelihood of
injury.
3 41
Switching to an "effect" rule-i.e., allowing the transmuta-
tion when misconduct "has the effect, albeit indirectly, of
specially injuring the minority shareholder"-would not solve the
problem. An effect rule would also sweep too broadly, allowing
a direct claim even when the majority is merely exercising "the
legitimate rights of selfish ownership." 42 Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the controlling shareholders wish the business to grow
and therefore reject a lucrative offer to buy a company asset.3 43
The minority shareholder wants a quick return and claims that,
given the conflict of goals, rejecting the offer caused a special
injury. Assuming the rejection was not part of an effort to
freeze-out the minority shareholder, a direct claim would be
completely inappropriate. 44
by the corporation, or the arbitration of disputes ....
Id. at subd. 2(a). Although the statute does not limit the times at which an agreement
may be made, ordinarily the minority shareholder's bargaining power is greatest just
prior to becoming a shareholder.
341. Cf Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993) (criticizing
lower court decisions which had held, for the purposes of attempted monopolization
claims, that evidence of specific intent to monopolize suffices as evidence of a
dangerous probability of success), remanded sub nom. McQuillan v. Sorobothane, Inc.,
23 F.3d 1531 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding with directions to dismiss). See HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY - THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE
§ 6.5(b), at 254 (1994).
342. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
343. This example assumes that the corporation is not "up for sale." If the
corporation were up for sale, those in control would have a duty to try to maximize the
sale price. See supra note 266.
344. If the rejection of the offer were part of a pattern intended to expropriate the
minority shareholder's value, the minority shareholder would have a direct claim under




The better rule is to allow transmutation only when the
derivative harm has occurred with the purpose and effect of causing
an injury targeted at the minority shareholder. The effect require-
ment precludes claims based on mere allegation of evil intent.
The purpose requirement precludes claims that reflect mere
differences in business judgment and is moreover consistent with
the "good faith" approach of Minnesota Statutes section
302A.751, subdivision 3a.345
In sum, a shareholder in a close corporation should be
able to bring a direct claim under any of the following circum-
stances:
(1) when the shareholder has suffered a direct injury, rather
than a injury merely in consequence of an injury to the
corporation;
46
(2) when the shareholder has suffered both direct and
indirect injuries, the direct injury is substantial rather
than de minimus and a single action can efficiently
remedy both injuries;3 "47 and
(3) when the shareholder has suffered only indirect injury,
the shareholder can show that the misconduct had the
purpose and effect of causing an injury targeted at the
plaintiff, and all shareholders are involved in the suit
either as alleged victims or alleged perpetrators.
VII. THE PROCEDURAL WRAP-UP: PLEADING AND REMEDIES
The special rule just suggested leaves open two issues: (i)
what must the plaintiff allege or establish in order to proceed
with direct claims; and (ii) when a direct plaintiff makes use of
derivative harms, how do those harms factor into the direct
remedy.
A. Pleading Requirements
As explained in Part IV, it is essential that the
direct/derivative issue be decided as early as possible."4 It
345. That subdivision refers to "the duty which all shareholders in a closely held
corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner." MINN.
STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3a.
346. See supra notes 269-70 (describing close corporation cases involving genuinely
direct injuries).
347. See supra part VI.B. (describing overlap cases).
348. See supra part IV (explaining the importance of making an early threshold
determination).
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follows therefore that to proceed with a direct claim a plaintiff
should have to plead facts, which if true, would satisfy one of the
tests stated in Part V. Plaintiff should plead these facts with
particularity. In this context, the pleadings function not merely
to give the defendants general notice of the claims, but also to
allow the court to make a fundamentally important determina-
tion."' The requirement of particularity is not onerous. If the
plaintiff has suffered a genuinely direct injury, the plaintiff has
the necessary facts at hand. If the plaintiff is seeking to trans-
mute a derivative claim, some information about corporate
operations will be necessary. However, given the intimate nature
of a close corporation, the plaintiff should have access to the
necessary information unless those in control of the corporation
are purposefully denying access. That denial would give the
plaintiff a direct cause of action in any event.35
B. Factoring Derivative Harms into Direct Remedies
When a close corporation shareholder dispute goes into
litigation, a buy-out becomes the remedy of choice. 5' If the
business is successful, dissolution is not only draconian but often
economically wasteful. 52 At the same time, it makes little
sense to keep warring parties locked into co-ownership of a
349. Cf MINN. R- Civ. P. 23.06 (requiring that "[t]he complaint [in a derivative
action] shall ... allege with particularity thle efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to
obtain the desired action from the directors ... and the reason for the plaintiffs
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort"); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d
180, 186 (Del. 1988); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984) (requiring that
derivative plaintiffs who assert demand futility to plead certain facts with particularity).
350. See Warthan v. Midwest Consol. Ins. Agencies, 450 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990); Chabot v. Industrial Relations Council, Inc., No. 8720942 (St. Louis County Dist.
Ct. Nov. 27, 1989), aff'd, No. C8-90-300, 1990 WL 119371 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21,
1990); Frenzel v. Logistics, Inc., No 457733 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1985)
(each holding that denying shareholders access to information engenders a direct
claim).
351. HarryJ. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits As A Remedy
for Close Corporations Dissentions, CLEV. ST. L. REv. 25, 43 (1986-87).
352. Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate
Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 296-97 (1989-90) (explaining that liquidating a
corporation does not yield the maximum value for the shareholders); BJUR & SOLHEIM,
supra note 44, § 8015, at 95 (explaining that courts view judicial dissolution as an
extreme remedy). See also MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3b (instructing courts to
consider "lesser relief" in lieu of dissolution). But see id. at subd. 3 (instructing, inter




In the context of a buy-out, it is a conceptually simple
matter to determine how to factor derivative harms into the
direct remedy. 54 The buy-out price is based on the fair value
of the corporation,155  and that fair value includes whatever
funds, property, or other assets have been diverted or depleted
from the corporation.
Although there is no reported Minnesota case precisely on
point, one unreported decision does illustrate this approach.
Henricksen v. Big League Game Co. was a direct suit alleging that
the defendant shareholder had breached fiduciary duties by
improperly issuing stock and making unauthorized corporate
distributions. 56 In determining the value of the complaining
shareholder's fifty percent interest, the court considered not only
the value of the corporate assets at the time of trial, but also the
value of the assets improperly withdrawn from the corpora-
tion.3
57
353. Cf MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(1) (permitting a court to dissolve a
corporation when "the directors or the persons having the authority otherwise vested
in the board are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs and the
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock"); MINN. STAT. § 323.31(4) (1994)
(permitting a court to dissolve a partnership when a partner "acts in matters relating
to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business
in partnership with that partner"); BJUR & SOLHEIM, supra note 44, § 8066, at 141
(explaining that inability to conduct business must be shown before courts will order
a dissolution).
354. The concept may be straightforward, but valuation disputes are anything but.
To the contrary, they are quite fact intensive, and typically involve a battle of experts.
See, e.g., Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. 1992) ("It is frequently
the case in appraisal proceedings that valuation disputes become a battle of experts.");
Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 175 (Del. 1991) ("As is often the
case in disputed appraisal proceedings, the dispute over the value of [corporation's]
shares at the time of the merger became a battle of the experts. ... ").
355. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 2. This subdivision does give some role to the
price set in "the bylaws of the corporation, a shareholder control agreement, the terms
of the shares, or otherwise." Id. However, if oppression has prompted the buy-out, the
court will disregard as "manifestly unreasonable" any agreed-upon price that is lower
than the actual fair value. Otherwise, the agreed-upon value will serve to effectuate the
oppression. Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), petition for
review denied, (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
356. Henricksen v. Big League Game Co., No. Co-95-388, 1995 WL 550935 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1995).
357. Id. at *2. The decision states this point obliquely:
It appears from the record that the trial court attempted to compare
the corporate assets at the time that [the plaintiff] withdrew from
active participation in the company to those that remained at the
time of the trial. The court determined what assets had been sold or
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An Eighth Circuit case, Foy v. Klapmeier,"8 supports the
approach by analogy. In Foy a minority shareholder brought a
combined derivative/appraisal action, alleging usurpation of
corporate opportunity. The court took into consideration the
worth of the usurped opportunity in determining the value of
the minority shareholder's five percent interest.
3 59
VIII. CONCLUSION
Understanding how to differentiate between direct and
derivative claims within a close corporation requires first
understanding the general rule for making that distinction.
Minnesota's general rule requires correction; its reference to
"same character" of injury should be replaced by the concept of
direct injury. With that correction in place, Minnesota should
then adopt a special rule for close corporations, allowing direct
claims (i) when the plaintiff has suffered purely direct harm, (ii)
when the plaintiff has suffered both direct and indirect harm,
and (iii) when the parties to the dispute comprise all the
valued and deducted the distributions already paid to [the plaintiff].
The court then calculated the remaining amount due to him for his
50 percent share of the corporate ownership.
Id.
358. 992 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1993).
359. Id. at 779. See also Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834, 838
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting a minority discount in oppression-triggered buy-out),
petition for review dented, (Minn. May 17, 1994); MT Properties v. CMC Real Estate Corp.,
481 N.W.2d 383, 386-87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting a minority discount in
appraisal proceeding). A line of Delaware appraisal cases provides support as well.
These cases hold that the fair value of the corporation, as determined in the appraisal
proceedings, includes the value of derivative claims. See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1142-43 (Del. 1989) (holding that, in light of parties'
stipulation, the trial court did not err in considering minority shareholder's loss of
corporate opportunity claim in an appraisal proceeding); Bomarko, Inc. v. International
Telecharge, Inc., No. CA13052, 1994 WL 198726, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1994)
(rejecting argument that derivative claims may only be asserted in an appraisal
proceeding under exceptional circumstances and holding that "breach of fiduciary duty
claims that do not arise from the merger are corporate assets that may be included in
the determination of fair value"); In re Radiology Associates, Inc., No. CIV.A9001, 1990
WL 67839, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1990) (holding that derivative claims which are
precluded for lack of standing and do not relate to the validity of the merger may be
considered in an appraisal proceeding); Porter v. Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc.,
No. CIVA9114, 1989 WL 120358, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 1989) (responding to
shareholders' suit seeking rescission of a merger on the grounds that the directors had
breached fiduciary duties and holding that "[i]f there is any value to the corporation
of the claims of mismanagement alluded to... in the complaint, that value would be
reflected in an appraisal award").
1274 [Vol. 22
1996] DIRECT VS. DERIVATIVE 1275
corporation's shareholders and those in control of the corpora-
tion have engineered corporate harms with the purpose and
effect of targeting the plaintiff.
When a plaintiff successfully adjudicates a direct claim, a
buy-out is typically the appropriate result. To the extent a direct
plaintiff has standing to invoke indirect harms, the buy-out price
should take into account the value of those harms.
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APPENDIX A
ANALYSIS AND RESTATEMENT OF MINNESOTA STATUTES SECTION
302A.751, SUBDISION 1 (b)(2) AND (3).
FIGURE 1. THE ELEMENTS
malefactors misconduct injured party injury status
subd. l(b)(2) directors/those fraudulent or (toward) share- in their capacity
in control illegel action holders as...
subd. l(b)(3) directors/those in a manner (toward) share- in their capacity
in control unfairly prejudicial holders as ...
FIGuRE 2. WHAT INJURIES ARE ACTIONABLE, ACCORDING TO
TYPE OF CORPORATION
type of corporation type of offense injury status giving rise to a claim
closely held fraudulent or illegal conduct injured qua shareholdera
injured qua directorb
injured qua officer or employee'
unfairly prejudicial conduct injured qua shareholderd
injured qua director'
injured qua officer or employee'
a. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1 (b) (3) (referring to "shareholders [injured] in
their capacities as shareholders").
b. Id. at subd. 1 (b) (2) (referring to "shareholders [injured] in their capacities as
... directors").
c. Id. (referring to "shareholders [injured] in their capacities ... as officers or
employees of a closely held corporation").
d. Id. at subd. l(b) (3) (referring to "shareholders [injured] in their capacities as
shareholders... of a corporation that is not publicly held").
e. Id. (referring to "shareholders [injured] in their capacities as ... directors of a
corporation that is not publicly held").
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f. Id. (referring to "shareholders [injured] in their capacities . . . as officers or
employees of a closely held corporation").
g. MINN. STAT. § 302A.011, subd. 40. Section 302A.011, subd. 40 defines a
publicly held corporation as "a corporation that has a class of equity securities
registered pursuant to section 12, or is subject to section 15(d), of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934." Id.
h. Section 302A.751, subd. l(b)(3) omits any reference to shareholders of a
corporation that is publicly held. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1 (b) (3). Indeed, the
clause specifically refers to corporations that are not publicly held. Id.
type of corporation type of offense injury status giving rise to a claim
not public (but not fraudulent or illegal conduct injured qua shareholde
CHO)
injured qua directorb
NOT qua officer or employeec
unfairly prejudicial conduct injured qua shareholder'
injured qua director'
NOT qua officer or employee'
publicly heldg fraudulent or illegal conduct injured qua shareholder'
injured qua director'
NOT qua officer or employee c
unfairly prejudicial conduct UNAVAILABLE, REGARDLESS
OF INJURY CAPACIMI-
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FIGURE 3. WHO CAN BRING CLAIMS, ACCORDING TO
TYPE OF MISCONDUCT
Type of Misconduct Shareholder Capacity/Corporation Type
fraudulent or illegal regardless of corporation type, qua shareholder or director
in a closely held corporation, also qua officer/employee
unfairly prejudicial in a publicly held corporation-no one
in a corporation not publicly held (but not close) qua
shareholder or director only
in a closely held corporation, in any of the four capacities, i.e.,
qua shareholder, director, officer or employee
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APPENDIX B. COMPARISON OF DIRECT AND DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
Direct Derivative
Plaintiff's status shareholder shareholder
Claim asserted on behalf self corporation
of
nature of injury to direct indirect
shareholder
source of claims common law and statutes; common law and statutes;
as to statutes, primarily as to statutes, primarily
302A.751 302A.251 and 302A.255
typical defendants the corporation (as a real the corporation (as a
party in interest) and nominal defendant) and
individual malefactors individual malefactors
contemporaneous probably' yes
ownership requirement
"fair and adequate no yes
representative"
requirement
demand requirement no yes
role of special litigation none substantial; possibly
committee dispositive
applicability of business no; Wilkes standard instead 2  yes
judgment rule
availability of exculpatory arguably not3  yes
provisions
availability of probably4  yes
indemnification for
individual defendants
typical remedies buy-out of complainant's corporate recovery,
interest including damages,
disgorgement (constructive




attorney's fees for plaintiff 302A.751 requires finding under "common fund"
"that a party ... has acted theory, plaintiffs attorney
arbitrarily, vexatiously, or is compensation from
otherwise not in good whatever money is
faith"3 recovered
'See supra note 121.
2 Se supra text accompanying notes 176-78.
See supra text accompanying notes 195-200.
See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
There is, however, some authority suggesting that § 302A.467 allows an award of attorney's
fees without such a finding. e supra note 48.
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